I have the honour to trace, in roughly chronological sequence, the
development of political feeling and events in this area since the
departure of the British forces. References to the Den Pasar
Conference [1] are incorporated here solely for the sake of
continuity in the narrative; that subject will be dealt with in a
separate despatch.

2. The departure of the British forces on 30th November 1946 did
not precipitate any special events in Java and Sumatra. There were
some rather formal expressions of thanks from Dutch official
sources and in the press, and the Dutch were obviously glad to see
the last of A.F.N.E.I. [2], but the main effect of the departure
was to bring home to both Dutch and Indonesians the fact that
responsibility lay where indeed it always had lain, namely on
their shoulders. The various bipartite committees set up during
the Killearn negotiations became dormant.

3. Early in the month, delay in reaching a decision at The Hague
came in for criticism by the Dutch, not only because of fears that
the initialled agreement [3] would prove to be no advance on the
position reached in March, but also because of a growing feeling
that the people at home did not have a full understanding of the
local position. This delay also caused the postponement of the
conference at Den Pasar, designed to set up the new Negara, or
State, of East Indonesia. On the Indonesian side the Masjoemi
decided to oppose the draft and Soetomo also beat up opposition to
it among his followers. The Masjoemi's decision cannot have been
unanimous as Dr. Roem, one of the Indonesian Delegation, was
present; moreover there are indications that the meeting, if not
actually packed, was at least manipulated and that the party is
not unanimous on the matter and may well be threatened with an
internal division. At this stage Sjahrir had behind him the
Socialist Party, the Socialist Youth, the Communist Party and
Soekarno's Nationalist Party.

4. The news of Jonkman's declaration at The Hague [4] caused
relief by removing the danger of outright rejection of the
agreement, on the assumption that unilateral modification, which
was felt to be even more dangerous, was not in prospect. It was on
receipt of this news that Dr. van Mook decided to-go to Den Pasar,
where his deputy, Dr. Hoven, had been holding the fort among the
delegates who had been waiting for about a week for the formal
opening of the conference, using the opportunity to present their
first resolution, which found very wide support, claiming
practically a hundred percent independence for East Indonesia.

5. In the Indonesian press the Masjoemi rejection decision
continued to receive prominence. The opinion was expressed that it
would not mean a split in the Cabinet, but the possibility rather
of a party split was speculated on.

6. On the 11th of December martial law was proclaimed at various
places in the Celebes-Mandar, Pare-Pare, Macassar, with the
expressed object of putting an end to terrorism and violence.

Apparently the earlier banning of the Partai Nasional Indonesia
had not had the desired effect. Dutch naval intelligence reports
about midDecember confirmed the existence of warm national feeling
in the East including Menado and Ambon.

7. By mid-December the delay at The Hague had undoubtedly
stimulated extreme opposition in the interior and Benteng
Indonesia (Fortress of Indonesia) emerged as a focal point of the
opposition being, said to co-ordinate the opposition of 24
parties, which is not after all a very high proportion of the more
than 130 parties said to exist in the interior. Soekarno and Hatta
were preparing for a large scale speaking tour in favour of the
agreement in the new year, and Sheikh Jamil Jambek, the most
influential Masjoemi leader in Sumatra, declared his support of
the agreement.

8. Some reference was apparently made in the debate in the States-
General to a Partai Rakjat Pasoendan, said to have been formed to
advance the interests of the Sundanese people of West Java, who
are of course historically distinct from the East Javanese. The
party appears to have been formed actually inside the Dutch
perimeter at Bandoeng and claims a membership of 6,000, all inside
the perimeter, and also a youth movement in the same area. Its
object of reviving the ancient Sundanese state seems to have no
future.

9. Meanwhile at Den Pasar Dr. van Mook had made his opening
speech, promising that East Indonesia would not be on a lower
level than the other states of United States of Indonesia, and an
incident had occurred involving the expulsion of seven Indonesian
journalists for alleged breaches of the spirit of Linggardjati in
having taken with them Indonesian publicity material.

10. The Dutch Army Information Services seemed during the month to
be preparing the public for increased military activity, and the
feeling among younger officers has been intensely anti-Commission-
General; moreover Dr. van Mook's repeated references to alleged
Indonesian breaches of the truce and the necessity of repressing
terrorism could be taken as support for this possibility.

Indonesian news sources are not wholly reliable, but although all
the perimeters were intermittently lively, on the whole the
situation has remained fairly quiet except where Dutch patrolling
has been denser and deeper in Java, and in Sumatra in
circumstances dealt with elsewhere.

11. The town of Buitenzorg which was an awkward spot when the
British were there furnished an incident after their departure.

Friction culminated in the shooting of nine Indonesians including
the Vice-Mayor. A joint commission visited the town and the Dutch
Commander apologised and promised that the guilty men would be
punished. Later, however, all the Indonesian Civil Police were
arrested, as well as the Indonesian Resident, and the Police
Headquarters were raided and some small arms and ammunitions
found. Another joint commission paid a visit. Dr. Roem protested
against the breach of the agreed arrangements for the maintenance
of the status quo, but the Dutch Commander declared that he had
nothing to do with considerations of that nature and that he had
acted purely militarily. He declined to produce his evidence or to
let Dr. Roem inter-view the Resident. As appears later, this
incident has now been settled.

12. The result of the debate in the States-General was received
quietly by both sides. Curiously enough important political
references came late in the month from the Dutch Admiral and the
Republican Commander-in-Chief. Admiral Pinke in his message of
Christmas cheer to his men warned them that Linggardjati 'may
prove to be a false light as the truce has', and General Soedirman
made an Indonesian-wide radio speech. He repeated the theme of
ceaseless struggle until independence is achieved, and counselled
unity and an aggressive spirit, saying that the Indonesians could
not remain idly passive while Netherlands activities were damaging
and violating Indonesian rights and property.

13. The Den Pasar Conference ended on Christmas eve with the
provisional organization of the new State of East Indonesia, New
Guinea being excluded thanks to Dr. van Mook's persuasion. The
first President is Soekawati of Bali, the Chairman of the
provisional government (analogous to speaker) is Tadjoeddin Noor
and the 'cabinet formator' Nadjamoeddin. The first parliament is
to meet early this year, when a decision on a flag for the new
State is to be made. At Den Pasar the red and white (Republican
colours) were demanded.

14. In Sumatra, General Soedirman's speech was interpreted by the
irregulars as authorising them to repudiate local truce
arrangements and noisy fighting broke out on all three Dutch
perimeters. In his New Year's Eve broadcast Dr. van Mook again
sounded the law and order note. However, he slaw Sjahrir and Dr.

Sjarifoedin and after the talk told the press that neither he nor
Mr. Sjahrir has any intention of abandoning the truce. He also
promised Mr. Sjahrir at this meeting to hand back the Republican
buildings at Buitenzorg within a few days, and to reinstate the
Republican civil administration and police as soon as the
investigation was completed. Also in a broadcast on January 4th
Dr. Sjarifoedin said that General Soedirman's broadcast had been
misinterpreted by many Indonesians as a call to battle. He said
'our Republican Government does not mean to and will never agree
to use force of arms. Only if we are compelled shall we meet force
by force'.

15. The Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Soekarno's old party) also
announced its opposition to the agreement. However, by a recent
presidential decree the Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat has been
increased by 150 to 413 members. Farmers and labourers, not
hitherto represented as such, now have 40 seats each, the
communists who had one now have 35, and generally the
representation of the left wing and outer possessions is
increased. The new distribution of seats is as follows:-

Masjoemi 67
Partai Nasionalis Indonesia45
" Sosialis 35
" Boeroeh (Labour) 35
" Kommunis Indonesia 35
" Kristen Indonesia 8
" Katholiek Rep. Indonesia 4
" Sumatra 50
Kalimantan (Borneo) 12
Soelawesi (Celebes) 15
Maluku (Moluccas) 7
Sunda Kechil 7
Chinese 7
Arabs 3
Netherlanders (!) 3
Kaoem Boeroeh (labourers) 40
Kaoem Tani (farmers) 40
413

This reorganization of representation makes party strength
throughout the country less important, and government circles
anticipate that this committee can be counted on to support it in
its acceptance of the agreement. The Government has not publicly
stated its attitude to the agreement and will presumably leave the
next move to the Dutch, awaiting a formal communication from the
Commission-General after its return this week. It has also been
announced that Dr. Romme, parliamentary leader of the Roman
Catholic People's Party, is to visit Indonesia in the near future.

16. The situation in Indo-China is being closely followed,
especially by the Indonesians. If the French suffer a military
defeat or near-defeat by the Viet Nam forces, the Republican
Government's control over its young men will be more difficult to
maintain.