Your telegram No. 236. [1] Netherlands Indies.

Thank you for your preliminary views regarding possible reference
of the Indonesian issue to U.N.O. We are fully seized of the
difficulties which might result from adoption of such a course and
of the desirability for consultation. It was for this reason that
we thought you should be advised informally of Sjahrir's very
indirect sounding as to the Australian attitude by means of a
letter addressed to Mr. Brookes personally. [2]

2. As we see the problem it is essential that every effort should
be made to ensure that both Dutch and Indonesians bring their
present negotiations to an early and successful conclusion. The
dangers of further delay are so clear, particularly in view of the
withdrawal of British forces from Netherlands East Indies during
the next few months, that we feel neither side should be
encouraged to think that adoption of an intransigent attitude will
further its own special interests.

3. As regards the Dutch, we feel that everything possible should
be done to make them recognise that Nationalist aspirations in
Indonesia are real and strong and that the Indonesians should be
met more than half way. The consequences of a failure of the
negotiations should be pointed out clearly. One of these
consequences is we believe the probability that the Indonesian
issue would be brought before the United Nations in some way or
other. In this connection we understand that Soekarno and others
are inclined to request India to raise the matter in U.N.O. Again
we are informed that China has already given some consideration to
the possibility of bringing the matter before U.N.O. or of
submission of the Indonesian question for mediation to a small
group of countries such as United Kingdom, United States and
Australia. Nor is it inconceivable that some other member of the
United Nations, whose interests in the Netherlands East Indies are
not so direct, might raise the question in the Security Council.

The possibility of U.N.O.'s jurisdiction being invoked is
therefore not limited to action by Australia.

4. As regards the Indonesians, we feel that if they were
encouraged at the present stage to believe that Australia or some
other country would certainly take up and argue their case before
U.N.O., they might be less disposed to bring the current
negotiations to a successful conclusion. For this reason we had
already taken steps to let it be known to Sjahrir informally that
it is very unlikely that Australia would find it possible to bring
the Indonesian question before U.N.O., particularly at present
when the Security Council has run into difficulties over Persia
and Spain.

5. As regards the suggestion made in the last sentence of
paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference, we do not feel that
it would be wise for the British Minister at Hague or for our own
Minister there to inform the Dutch specifically of Sjahrir's
letter. If such information were made public by the Dutch or
conveyed to Sjahrir by other means, it would be embarrassing to
us. At the same time there has been reference in the press and
over the radio in Batavia and elsewhere to the possibility that
Australia might be asked by the Indonesians to raise the
Indonesian question before U.N.O. We feel that reference could
well be made to these reports and that a hint might even be given
that the reports should not be regarded as idle gossip. At the
same time, possible action by India, China and other countries
could be mentioned in order to impress upon the Dutch the very
real likelihood that the Indonesian issue if not settled soon
between parties will be brought to the United Nations. This might
contribute towards persuading the Dutch to take the more realistic
view of the situation in Indonesia to which you have referred.