Atomic 9.

Reference A.35. [1] Your helpful comments on our cable have been
provisionally studied by Oliphant and Briggs.

In view of further discussions by Oliphant and Briggs with
American, British, French and Canadian atomic scientists and
engineers, it is probable that the proposals set out in the
Lilienthal Report may need modification in the light of further
technical considerations. Information from a number of sources
suggests that Baruch is likely to put forward modified proposals
at the first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 14th.

Revision may be necessary because of the grave difficulty of
organizing and implementing effectively any formal system of
technical inspection which would involve interference with all
national undertakings in every form of scientific effort, mining
and engineering production and development, and which would
require colossal numbers of highly skilled inspectors. However, it
is believed by experts that if all rights in atomic energy of all
forms were invested in the United Nations, the actual operations
of mining and exploitation of atomic energy could be carried out
by individual States and industries under proper provision for
control by the world authority. If it were the duty of every
nation or industry to allow free interchange of information and of
technical personnel in the plants and mines under its
jurisdiction, with those of every other nation, through the
central authority, it is believed that a natural method of
inspection would result, and if this were coupled with a free
interchange of personnel in other branches of science and in other
fields of human activity, this unofficial inspection could be
effective and free from undue irritation. The whole of the
development of atomic energy would thus be carried out as a world-
wide co-operative effort. Such a system could be extended at a
later date to include other subjects which are potentially capable
of creating weapons of mass destruction.

The separation of activities into dangerous and non-dangerous
categories as made in the Lilienthal Report can hardly be made the
sole basis of control, for though such a division can be very
helpful it has too many loopholes for evasion arising from the
limited effectiveness of the denaturing process and from the rapid
progress in technique which is thought already to be practicable.

Contact with the American experts, especially through Oliphant,
suggests that the development of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes could proceed more effectively and much more rapidly than
was at one time thought practicable. Some of the information
necessary to enable this development to proceed in countries other
than United States of America and United Kingdom (to which namely
United Kingdom atomic power for industrial purposes may be of
greater industrial importance than to United States of America) is
of some significance in the preparation of the military weapon,
but early release of this knowledge would not be dangerous
provided satisfactory agreement has been reached on a co-operative
scheme of operation. If agreement broke down it would not change
significantly the time required for an aggressive nation to make
bombs.

It will be noted that the changes which seem likely to be made in
the Lilienthal proposals are changes in emphasis and in timing of
release of information rather than changes in principle. It is
possible that further modifications will become necessary in the
light of the work done on the technical side of the Atomic Energy
Commission.