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303 Evatt to Department of External Affairs

Cablegram 751 WASHINGTON, 11 June 1946

Regarding D.O. telegram D.566 [1], following are comments on
message:

1. There is overwhelming cause for consulting actual belligerents
at conference rather than remitting discussions to United Nations
majority of whom had nothing to do with winning war and some of
whom were unfriendly neutrals.

2. It is interesting to note United States in thinking of Peace
Conference intended to invite all United Nations. They changed
policy not because Soviet insisted, but because Australia and
other belligerents insisted on right to share in peace-making
after sharing in fighting.

3. There might be more justification for reference to United
Nations of situation caused by unsettled peace terms after
conference of belligerents has met. As it is, there is nothing to
stop situation from being brought before Security Council by any
member of United Nations, and until it is disposed of the Assembly
will have no Jurisdiction.

4. Most disturbing aspect of both telegrams is fact that decision
as to course to be taken is assumed to be decision for two or
three countries only. Even if matter is to be dealt with by United
Nations through Council or Assembly, active belligerents should be
invited to confer to determine steps to be taken. in other words,
decision as to course should not be decision for two or three
belligerent powers but all belligerents who desire to participate
in such decision. This point is of crucial importance because fact
is that, belligerents not included in Council of Foreign Ministers
have not been given rights accorded them by Moscow decision of 4th
December last [2] and they, as a very minimum, should at least be
conferred with to determine next practical step which should be
taken in accordance with their undoubted right to share in peace-
making.

5. Therefore, if it is impossible for conference of belligerents
to go ahead with peace-making, conference should be summoned to
examine situation caused by failure of Council of Foreign
Ministers to agree, and such a preliminary conference of
belligerents should be summoned at earliest possible moment if it
appears Council of Foreign Ministers will not reach agreement.

6. Message contained herein should go immediately to London,
Wellington, Ottawa and Pretoria, and Dominions should be asked to
communicate suggestions. Substance of suggestions should also be
communicated to Washington, Paris and Nanking.

1 Dispatched 3 June, it reported on an exchange of telegrams
between Bevin and Byrnes concerning the deadlock over summoning a
peace conference. Byrnes had suggested in a broadcast that, if the
Soviet Union remained obdurate, recourse might be had to the U.N.

General Assembly. Bevin had suggested three alternatives: the
United Kingdom, United States, France, and perhaps China, might
proceed without the Soviet Union; governments might make separate,
bilateral peace treaties with enemy states; governments might make
ad hoc arrangements with enemy states. Byrnes had rejected these
alternatives, repeating his preference for recourse to the United
Nations.

2 The proposal that all belligerents might attend a peace
conference had been submitted, in fact, by the United States at
the Moscow meeting on 18 December 1945, and accepted by the Soviet
Union several days later.


[AA:A4387/2, A46/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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