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Historical documents

281 Department of External Affairs to Evatt

Cablegram A1 CANBERRA, 30 May 1946

Following are Sir Frederic Eggleston's comments on United States
draft treaty on disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan. [1]

(1) There is no specific reference in Potsdam Declaration of July
26, 1945 [2], to a treaty controlling the disarmament of Japan nor
is there any such reference in any of the documents constituting
the Japanese Surrender. The reference to Japanese disarmament in
the Potsdam Declaration in Clause 7 is vague and incomplete. The
citation of the declaration in the Preamble of the proposed treaty
is not accurate. It seems reasonable, however, to set up a system
of disarmament control and inspection and to agree to complete
such disarmament as a condition of giving up occupation.

(2) I do not see anything in the terms of reference of the Far
Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan [3] which
touches the matter of disarmament directly, but in my opinion the
question of disarmament comes under clause 11 A (1) of the terms
of reference of F.E.C.

(3) Whether the treaty should be confined to the four great powers
and whether it should be pronounced upon by the Far Eastern
Commission are matters of importance. If Australia is not included
it should at least insist on reference to the Far Eastern
Commission at the appropriate time.

(4) I gather from the report of the Council of Foreign Ministers
that the two disarmament treaties for Germany and Japan were put
in by the United States of America as a means of meeting Russian
suspicion of United States motives and showing that United States
was prepared to commit herself to the execution of the Peace
Treaties. This seems to me to be statesmanlike. It is exceedingly
important to get the United States of America deeply committed and
to see that her move in this direction is not frustrated and my
judgment is that it would be a mistake for Australia at this stage
to do anything which might look antagonistic to the treaty.

(5) It looks as if Molotov is stalling Byrnes' move-see telegram
509, para. 15. [4] An attitude like this may precipitate the trend
visible in United States of America towards isolationism and is to
be regretted.

(6) The treaty can of course be criticised in detail, for
example:-

(a) it does not actually set up the Commission but leaves it to
subsequent agreement;

(b) action when called for has to await common agreement at the
time;

(c) the terms are too sweeping and might prevent a good deal of
peaceful activity.

1 Document 253, See also Document 255.

2 Volume VIII, Document 163.

3 See Document 6 and Document 124, note 2.

4 Presumably Addison's cablegram D506, dispatched 18 May. It
described Molotov's blocking discussion of a U.S. proposal to
speed preparation of a German peace treaty by appointment of
special deputies. Paragraph 15 reported Byrnes' explanation that
the U.S. Govt had only proposed disarmament and demilitarisation
treaties for Germany and Japan after encouragement by Stalin, his
emphasis that the United States was ready to play a part both in
Germany and Japan, and his disappointment that a move
unprecedented in U.S. history had been misunderstood.


[AA:A3196, 1946, 0.10773/87]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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