PMM(46)22 LONDON, 4 May 1946

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES' REQUEST FOR BASES

I circulate herewith a message, dated the 2nd May, which I have
received from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Paris.

I shall be glad if this can be regarded as of special secrecy.

As I stated at the last meeting [1], the United Kingdom Government
have decided that they could not agree to the immediate cession of
Tarawa.

C. R. A.

(Most Immediate.)
Top Secret

SPECIAL BASES

(No. 53.)
2nd May, 1946. D. 1.00 a.m. 3rd May, 1946.

Repeated to Washington. R. 1.45 a.m. 3rd May, 1946.

For Prime Minister from the Secretary of State:

My telegram No. 32 of the 1st May.

I saw Mr. Byrnes this afternoon about the Pacific Bases, when I
began by taking the same general line as that recorded in my
telegram No. 10 of the 27th April, explaining that the three
members of the British Commonwealth concerned were very anxious to
get together with the United States about this, which concerned
our own property and should therefore not impinge upon the United
Nations position. Mr. Byrnes would already have seen the formula
drawn up in London [2] with this aim in view (i.e., that referred
to in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 32) what our three
Governments were really anxious about was to get into a conference
with the United States and to look at the problem as a whole. We
all three recognised that the South Pacific could not be safe
unless the Americans were in it and had no wish to stand on points
of pride or prestige in this matter.

2. Mr. Byrnes had earlier in the day informed me that he was much
worried about the reports reaching Washington from the English
papers showing the world publicity [3] that there was an intention
of trying to tie up the United States in some form of regional
defence arrangements in this area. He now returned to this and
said that it would be quite impossible for the United States to do
anything of the kind. It would be unwise (for instance, in that it
would provoke Russia) and there would be no excuse for it. He
gathered that the Australian Government were concerned to know
what the United States Government's defence plans were. Mr. Byrnes
said that his Government had no one against whom they need prepare
to defend themselves, nor, when he wrote his letter of the 19th
April [4] (see Washington telegram No. 254, to the Foreign Office)
was it because his Government desired to enter into any plans
against a possible enemy.

The reason for his letter was the situation regarding the debate
in Congress on the loan to the United Kingdom. Two Senators had
put down amendments raising the question of the future of bases,
and what Mr. Byrnes had wanted was to have some general statement
which he could use (e.g., through the Democratic leader in the
Senate) to the effect that he had an understanding with the United
Kingdom in general on this matter. If this was not obtainable, he
must resign himself to a difficult debate with a balance of a vote
or two one way or the other.

3. Mr. Byrnes said that it was quite wrong to suggest that the
United States Government were keenly concerned, eg., about Manus
Island. They were not, nor were they interested in the whole of
the area in question in the sense of wishing to keep forces there.

The United States Navy only wanted to be able to call in at Manus
for minor repairs. It was not their intention to keep the place up
as a base. The same kind of arguments applied, eg., to Canton.

4. Mr. Byrnes recognised that the matter was causing a good deal
of difficulty to settle, and if it was too much trouble to the
British Commonwealth Governments to arrange matters in the sense
he had suggested, then the matter would have to be dropped (or, as
he put it, 'we must kiss it good-bye').

5. The question of sovereignty in the disputed islands then came
up. Mr. Byrnes repeated the argument he has used previously, that
all he wanted was to get this matter out of the way now, in order
to have something to show Congress: it was a good moment to settle
a longstanding dispute.

6. Some discussion then took place about the various places which
Mr. Byrnes had included in his list. In the course of this, the
question of landing rights and other facilities for aircraft was
mentioned and Mr. Byrnes said that if any of the disputed islands
were to be ceded to the United States (including the three in
which he had asked for exclusive bases) the United States
Government would be prepared to give the United Kingdom and the
other Commonwealth Governments full landing rights and other
similar facilities at any time.

7. I then discussed with Mr. Byrnes what arrangements might be
made as regards the three islands, Christmas, Canton and Funafuti.

We considered a possible scheme whereby we might agree to cede the
first two to the United States, who would maintain what bases and
other installations were required and give us the full right to
use their facilities for military and civil aviation purposes. In
the case of Funafuti, the arrangement might be that we should keep
the sovereignty, but should rent a base to the United States in
which she should enjoy the same aviation facilities as above.

8. It might be desirable to throw any other of the disputed
islands at present administered by the United Kingdom, which were
worthless from the point of colonisation or otherwise, into the
bag. The question of islands where the United States were only
asking for joint bases was only lightly touched upon, but the
question of aviation facilities in such bases did not seem either
to Mr. Byrnes or to myself to present very special difficulties.

9. I undertook to recommend to the favourable consideration of my
colleagues and of the Dominion Ministers' Conference the
possibility of a solution along these lines.

10. The question of Tarawa then came up. Mr. Byrnes said that the
reason for his suggesting the possibility of our ceding the island
in his letter of the 19th April was the sentimental value which
United States public opinion attached to it as the scene of one of
the most glorious actions of the United States Marines. I said
that I was well aware of this and that Lord Halifax had made the
same suggestion before and I was personally in strong sympathy
with it. Mr. Byrnes said that it would be of very great value to
the administration in dealing with the loan debate if the island
could be ceded and some form of announcement made singling it out
as having been ceded on account of British recognition of the
interest which it had taken on for the United States public as the
result of the action of the United States Marines.

11. I said that I agreed with Mr. Byrnes's view and that I would
have an immediate message sent to London urging that agreement be
given to an announcement in this general sense being made at the
earliest possible moment, if possible to-morrow, the 3rd May,
which Mr. Byrnes said was a critical day in the passage of the
loan through Congress. The announcement would stress that Tarawa
was being ceded as a memorial to the United States forces who had
died in reconquering it. As I see it, the announcement should
concentrate solely on this point, making the grand gesture, and
there should, of course, be no mention of the loan debate. I had
considered the possibility that the announcement might add
something to the effect that urgent consideration was being given
by the British Commonwealth Governments concerned to the question
of certain United States proposals for the future administration
and use of defence bases established by the United States during
the war in territory in the south-west Pacific administered by
British Commonwealth Governments. This would allow us to give some
further consideration as to what was to be done as regards those
bases. I think, however, that it would be better to keep this out
of this particular announcement and that we should reserve any
communication on this latter point until we have worked out policy
(including the points made earlier in this telegram) rather more
fully. I shall await your decision about Tarawa between eleven and
twelve to-morrow morning and suggest that when I have conveyed
decision to Byrnes and all is settled you may feel able to
interrupt proceedings in the House (as it is Friday) to make the
announcement. Could you send me text of what you propose to say?
12. Mr. Byrnes said expressly that, if we were prepared to cede
Tarawa, the United States would maintain an air base there and
would give us full landing and other aviation rights. This should,
of course, not be mentioned in announcement.

13. I asked Mr. Byrnes whether further discussion of the other
places which he had listed could take place on a four-party basis.

Mr. Byrnes replied that he would be very happy to talk with Dr.

Evatt and with Mr. Nash in Washington when they were on their way
back to their own countries. But he was clearly not prepared to
agree to a four-party talk. He stressed again that the United
States were not interested in establishing any system of regional
defence in the south-west Pacific and that their own defence
interests lay further north.