Reference telegrams A.8 [1] and ACJ.5 and 6. [2] Allied Council
for Japan.

After considering these matters as a whole I have formed the
following views-
1. Procedure for instructions to Ball. The agreed arrangement set
out in telegram 118 [3] to Dominions Office made it clear that
Ball receives his instructions from me and that it is my
responsibility to keep the other 3 Governments informed. In some
cases it may be both practicable and desirable for me to ascertain
their views before giving any instructions to Ball. In others it
may be unnecessary or even impossible to do so. You will
understand that the reference of questions to other Governments
before I have had an opportunity of deciding what course of action
is desirable is bound to lead to confusion. I may have an
opportunity shortly of explaining this procedure to the other
Governments with a view to ensuring a satisfactory understanding.

2. All information I have received since your 171 [4] to the
Dominions Office shows that the fundamental matter now requiring
attention is that raised in paragraph (b) of your A.8 and Ball's
telegrams ACJ5 and 6, namely the attitude of the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers and its representatives towards the council and its
functions. This is not a question which Ball should attempt to
handle within the Council, nor do I think that the stage has yet
been reached to justify Ball's suggestion of relinquishing our
position in the Council. Allowance must be made for the fact that
Marquat and Whitney are the direct representatives of MacArthur
and we should certainly await the arrival of A[t]cheson [5] before
passing any judgment on the utility of the Council. I confidently
expect that his presence in the Council will introduce a marked
improvement of conditions. I am not disturbed that Ball should
have found it desirable on occasions to give support to the Soviet
representative. This strikes me as being no more than normal if
the Council is to function as we intend it to, i.e. as a real
advisory body. Basically the question raised by the attitude so
far adopted by MacArthur can only be settled at the governmental
level and I will discuss this with Byrnes in the very near future.

Meanwhile Ball should use caution in raising the matter with
A[t]cheson.

3. On the 3 points referred to you by Ball (your telegram 171 to
the Dominions Office) I have seen and taken into account the views
of other governments. Ball should be instructed as follows-
(a) At the outset and until the position is clearer he should in
each case when proposing to take any initiative consult with his
committee of advisers and in the light of their views form a
proposal and submit it for instructions.

(b) He should do everything possible to promote harmonious
relations within the Council but this does not impose on him any
special duty of mediation between the Americans and Russians. He
should endeavour to carry out the policy as already approved and
refer doubtful cases to me for instructions. It is most important
that, pending Acheson's forthcoming visit to Japan [6], he should
not cause unnecessary antagonism with General MacArthur to whom
Australia owes so much for his great services.

(c) His views concerning deputy secretaries-general appear
reasonable.

4. Regarding the points raised in your 177 [7] to the Dominions
Office it is quite clear from the terms of the Moscow agreement
that except in the contingency contemplated in paragraph 6 the
functions of the Council are purely advisory and consultative.

Further, having regard to paragraph 5 of the agreement, Supreme
Commander Allied Powers' contention that the Council's functions
are limited to further directives is arguable, though I do not
agree with it. At the same time it is reasonable to assume that in
framing its views on the directives referred to it the Council
will have available all necessary information deriving from
directives and orders from the Supreme Commander Allied Powers
previously issued. This would appear to be a matter of reasonable
accommodation. The issue is not so much the legal interpretation
of the terms of the Moscow agreement as the real status of the
Council in the light of the apparent inclination of the Supreme
Commander Allied Powers to depreciate its functions.

5. I doubt whether the matters mentioned in paragraph (c) of A.8
are in the long run of great importance for the successful working
of the Council, but approve generally the line that Ball has
taken.