(ii) It is not desired that you should pursue a settled policy of
mediation between Americans and Russians. You should therefore
refer important cases for consultation. However you will of course
do everything possible to promote harmonious relations in Council.

(iii) Your view concerning Deputy Secretaries General is supported
and in the circumstances your action in agreeing to their
appointment is endorsed.

(b) Extent of authority of ACJ. While appointment announced today
of A[t]cheson of State Department as Chairman and United States
member of Council may mean that conditions for settlement of this
issue are improving, nevertheless issue remains and is
fundamental. Perusal of summary of MacArthur Memorandum would seem
to warrant confirmation of preliminary views in our 177 to
Dominions Office. [6] There appear to be two courses for
consideration by the British Commonwealth Governments concerned:-

(i) To instruct Ball to oppose MacArthur's interpretation openly
in Council and propose reference to higher authority. This,
however, would place MacArthur in an invidious position,
especially in event of verdict against him and might render
understanding virtually impossible. Moreover, prejudicial
publicity would be unavoidable.

(ii) To take up question immediately for settlement by diplomatic
interchange between Allied Powers or perhaps by Council of Foreign
Ministers. (Incidentally a question of control of Japan viz:

reparations may be brought before Council of Foreign Ministers
according to confidential advice from our Far Eastern Commission
Delegation, Washington. [7]) If this course were adopted it might
be useful meanwhile for Ball to discuss matter privately with
A[t]cheson or MacArthur and point out our desire to arrive at a
better understanding and smoother working of Allied Council. He
could say that in view of the British Commonwealth Governments
concerned MacArthur's interpretation of authority of Council is
open to doubt, that interpretation of Moscow terms of reference is
being sought at Governmental level and that meanwhile it would be
desirable to avoid contention in Tokyo of such basic questions.

Macmahon Ball had commented privately to us as follows on
MacArthur memorandum to Allied Council and on meeting of 17th
April:-

'MacArthur's inaugural speech at the first meeting of the Council,
MacArthur's memorandum to the Council Chairman and general conduct
of Council meeting are now clear indications that MacArthur
desires to torpedo the Allied Council. The account which MacArthur
and his representatives gave of the Council's powers and functions
is clearly inconsistent with the terms of reference. I feel that
members of the Council are placed in an embarrassing and
humiliating position. I have held my hand on your instructions but
can assure you after full consideration that if MacArthur persists
in the present policy the Council will soon become the object of
the world's laughter.' [8]

We think there is ground for believing that MacArthur would like
to prevent the Council exercising supervision or gaining prestige.

If he succeeded, Allied participation in control of Japan would be
frustrated and application of Allied policy as formulated by Far
Eastern Commission in Washington would be in doubt. It is not
clear, however that this attitude correctly represents that of the
United States Government, which at the least will presumably abide
with Moscow communique which lays down Council's terms of
reference.

(c) Procedural.

(i) Russian requests for advance information.

Instructions to Ball might be that MacArthur's replies in
memorandum of 9th April to Russian requests at first meeting (see
170 to Dominions Office 12th April [9]) appear on the whole
satisfactory. Ball should continue to follow the line he adopted
at first meeting I.E. to support Council's right to receive in
reasonable time proposed S.C.A.P. orders and relevant information.

(ii) Power of Council to regulate procedure.

We have not yet had report from Ball on meeting of Friday 19th but
press report indicated deadlock referred to in report on meeting
of Wednesday 17th was not resolved. [10] We can see no alternative
to view that Council must have powers to regulate its own
procedure within its terms of reference. In the absence of
provisions governing procedure suggest Ball be instructed to
request an immediate special meeting limited to Council members
and advisers to formulate agreed rules of procedure.

[AA:A1067, ER46/13/24]

1 See Documents 187 and 190, note 3.

2 See Document 201, note 2.

3 Document 188.

4 Document 194.

5 Both Govts had replied on 18 April, accepting the reply proposed
in Document 188, paragraph 2(c), but dissenting from that in 2(b),
New Zealand holding that Ball should not be given 'general
authority' to mediate between U.S. and Soviet Union viewpoints,
and India urging 'the greatest caution'. India also suggested that
the 'general authority' proposed in 2(a) should be withheld.

6 Dispatched 15 April to London, New Delhi, Wellington and Tokyo,
it summarised Ball's cablegram 156 (Document 187), and the
instructions to Ball in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Document 190. It
argued a 'preliminary' view that it was inconsistent with the
A.C.J.'s terms of reference to describe its functions as
'exclusively advisory and consultative', and that paragraph 1 of
the terms (see Document 124, note 2) appeared wide enough to
include a power of review.

7 A seperate cable to Evatt on 22 April reported that N. V.

Novikov, Charge d'Affaires at U.S.S.R. Embassy in Washington, had
made the suggestion to Moscow following U.S.-Soviet talks in which
the Soviet Union had opposed the F.E.C. handling reparations
allocations.

8 In cablegram 163 (DEP8), dispatched 18 April.

9 Giving the substance of Document IT, paragraphs 3-9.

10 See Document 201, note 2. Cablegram ACJ4, reporting the
meeting, was not received Until 23 April.