Extracts [MELBOURNE], 10 April 1946

SECRET

PROGRESS REPORT AS AT 23RD MARCH, 1946, ON THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE

INTRODUCTORY-THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANISATION:

By agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, India,
Australia and New Zealand it was decided to send a British
Commonwealth Force to participate in the occupation of Japan. To
implement the planning for this Force it was decided that the
higher Defence machinery of Australia should be used and that,
accordingly, the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the
Defence Committee should be expanded by the inclusion of overseas
representatives. The extended Chiefs of Staff Committee, known as
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia is vested with control of
B.C.O.F. including administration; it deals primarily with matters
of essentially military significance. The extended Defence
Committee, in conformity with Australian practice, deals with the
broader administrative matters affecting Government control and
policy. The first meeting of J.C.O.S.A. was held on 5th December,
1945. Representatives of the other British Commonwealth countries
concerned have been integrated into the machinery of the Defence
Department and the Australian Service Headquarters, for the
implementation of J.C.O.S.A. and Extended Defence Committee
decisions.

2. Considerable discussion has taken place concerning the
organisation of planning and administrative staffs to serve
J.C.O.S.A. and covering the procedure to be followed. As an
interim measure, and to ensure speed in planning, with the minimum
dislocation of the Australian Staffs, Directors of Joint Plans,
U.C.O.S.A.) have been appointed with a small Joint Planning Staff
(J.C.O.S.A.) to provide permanent assistance. These directors work
under the direction of J.C.O.S.A.

3. Arising out of the experience of the first four months of
planning for B.C.O.F., for purposes of concise record and for
guidance in the setting up of a similar organisation in future,
J.C.O.S.A. has recommended that its functions and responsibilities
should be set out in the form of a directive, to be issued by the
Australian Government after concurrence by the other Commonwealth
Governments concerned. A draft of this directive is now in course
of preparation.

U.S. GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL:

4. The original specific proposals to the State Department,
Washington, concerning the participation of a British Commonwealth
Force in the occupation of Japan, were contained in a letter dated
20th October, 1945, from the Australian Legation, Washington, to
the State Department. [1] General Northcott, as Commander-in-
Chief, B.C.O.F., went to Tokyo, arriving 12th December for
discussions with General MacArthur. A 'Memorandum for Record' was
signed by General Northcott and General Marshall on behalf of
S.C.A.P. on the 18th December, outlining tentative arrangements
for the participation of a British Commonwealth Force in the
occupation of Japan. [2]

5. By 23rd December agreement in principle to the 'Memorandum for
Record' had been given by the Governments of the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand and India. Notification of the agreement of
the U.S. Government was not received until 24th January-only 8
days before the first advance element of the Force was scheduled
to arrive in Japan. The uncertainty engendered by this delay was a
considerable embarrassment in planning for the Force, particularly
in the allocation of shipping.

COMPOSITION OF B.C.O.F.:

6. The British Commonwealth Force totals approximately 35,500
Navy, Army and Air Force personnel. The approximate strengths of
the national contingents are shown in the following table:-

Country Total %
United Kingdom 9,954 28.1) 55.2
India 9,611 27.1)
Australia 11,446 32.3
New Zealand 4,425 12.5
Total B.C.O.F.: 35,436 100%

7. The principal formations of the Force which are commanded by an
integrated Force Headquarters are:-

(a) A port party of shore based R.N. personnel;

(b) Integrated Force and base units;

(c) One British and one Indian Brigade, together with British and
Indian ancillary troops forming a two brigade division;

(d) One Australian Brigade Group;

(e) One New Zealand Brigade Group; and
(f) An Air Component, organised into a tactical group under an
integrated headquarters, including the following:-

(i) One Single Engined Fighter Wing comprising two R.A.F. and one
R.I.A.F. Spitfire Squadron and one R.N.Z.A.F. Corsair Squadron.

(ii) One Single Engined Fighter Wing comprising three R.A.A.F.

Mustang Squadrons.

(iii) One Squadron R.A.F. Regiment.

AREA ALLOTTED To B.C.O.F.:

8. The initial area allotted to the Force was the Prefecture of
Hiroshima. The area has now been extended to include the
Prefectures of Shimane and Yamaguchi, and it is anticipated that,
subject to Governmental approval, it will be further enlarged by
June, 1946, to include the Prefectures of Tottori and Okayama and
the island of Shikoku. The Commander-in-Chief, B.C.O.F., has
stated that he considers the resources of the Force as at present
planned quite adequate to handle the additional responsibilities
of this further extension.

9. With regard to these further extensions of the B.C.O.F. area of
responsibility, the United Kingdom has suggested that
consideration be given instead to taking over the areas of Kobe
and Osaka. General Northcott has reported that the U.S.

authorities are not opposed to handing over these areas but as the
two Prefectures are very thickly populated and as they are a
possible centre of civil strife, he considered that to take them
over complete would be beyond the capacity of B.C.O.F. at the
present time. The possibility of taking over only a portion of the
Kobe and Osaka Prefectures is now being examined, by General
Northcott and he will submit a report later on this aspect.

OCCUPATIONAL ROLE OF THE FORCE:

10. The occupational role of B.C.O.F., under the direction of
S.C.A.P., within the allotted area, as set out in the Directive to
the Commander-in-Chief, B.C.O.F., submitted to the four
Governments concerned for their concurrence, is-
(a) The safeguarding of the Allied installations and of all
Japanese installations awaiting demilitarisation;

(b) The demilitarisation and disposal of Japanese installations
and armaments; and
(c) Military control, not including Military Government.

11. The U.S. Military Government organisation is remaining in the
B.C.O.F. occupation area with its Headquarters in Kure. In the
interim period between the withdrawal of U.S. Forces and the
arrival of the various elements of B.C.O.F., the guarding of
buildings, etc., required by the British Commonwealth Force has
been made the responsibility of the local Japanese police.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE FORCE

12. B.C.O.F. is under the supreme command of S.C.A.P. to whom
Commander-in-Chief, B.C.O.F., will have the right of direct access
on matters of major policy affecting the operational commitments
of the Force. The shore based Naval personnel are under the
operational control of the U.S. Naval Commander exercising
jurisdiction over Japanese ports; the Army component under the
operational control of the Commanding General of the 8th U.S.

Army; and the Air Force component under the operational control of
the Commanding General, Pacific Air Command, U.S. Army, as a
separate Air Command under 5th U.S. Army Air Force.

PLANNING FOR B.C.O.F.:

13. The results of early planning were embodied in a draft Joint
Army Administrative Plan which was issued 15th February, and a
draft Joint Air Administrative Plan issued 30th January, which
have been circulated to all concerned for use as an interim
working basis. These plans have been used as the basis of a 'Plan
for a British Commonwealth Force to participate in the Occupation
of Japan', which is an Overall Plan in four parts, Part I
concerning Service matters and Parts II, III and IV
embodying matters peculiar to the Naval, Army and Air components
respectively. This draft Overall Plan has been circulated for
comment to the Principal Staff Officers at the Australian Service
Headquarters, which are the Headquarters through which executive
action concerning administration of B.C.O.F. is taken. A number of
paragraphs of the Overall Plan have still to be completed, or are
contingent on Governmental approval to certain J.C.O.S.A.

proposals such as those which appear in the draft directive to
Commander-in-Chief, B.C.O.F., and in connection with financial
arrangements.

14. in addition to the delay, already mentioned, in obtaining a
formal agreement from the United States Government a number of
other early planning difficulties were encountered:-

(a) Probably the outstanding early planning difficulty was lack of
knowledge of the port capacity which would be available to the
Force at Kure. Definite information was not received until 15th
January. This, in addition to the world shortage of shipping and
the wide geographical dispersion of the contingents of the Force,
rendered the preparation of a firm movement programme extremely
difficult.

(b) The national contingents of B.C.O.F. had by January been
waiting for many months for their move to Japan. Headquarters,
B.C.O.F., and certain integrated units, on the other hand, had
only just begun to assemble. Consequently, it was not possible to
carry out the normal Force planning, whereby the Commander
prepares his plan with the assistance of his staff and submits it
to the Chiefs of Staff for approval.

DIRECTIVES:

15. A final draft directive for the guidance of Commander-in-
Chief, B.C.O.F., has been recommended by J.C.O.S.A. and is at
present being considered by the British Commonwealth Governments
concerned. A draft standard directive for senior National
Commanders, suitable for issue by the Governments concerned, will
shortly be considered by J.C.O.S.A. and similarly will be
submitted for Governmental consideration.

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION:

16. As a temporary measure pending Governmental agreement to the
Directive to Commander-in-Chief, B.C.O.F., it was decided by
J.C.O.S.A. that, with effect from 18th March, the channels of
communication for Headquarters, B.C.O.F., should become-
(a) On matters of policy to J.C.O.S.A. through the Australian
Chiefs of Staff as agents.

(b) Direct with the appropriate Australian Service Headquarters on
other matters, particularly those requiring staff action in
relation to the current activity of B.C.O.F.

FINANCE:

17. The Extended Defence Committee recommended on 25.2.46, for
consideration by the British Commonwealth Governments concerned
that the costs of B.C.O.F., other than those which it shall be
agreed as being the separate responsibility of such Governments,
should be apportioned according to the following percentages:-

United Kingdom 30%
India 30%
Australia 30%
New Zealand 10%

No decision has yet been reached. [3]

18. The additional major policy decisions to be made on a
Governmental level are:-

(a) Whether resources allocated to B.C.O.F. should be regarded for
accounting and administrative purposes as the common property of
the Force, and as in a common pool;

(b) Whether the pool costs should be inclusive of those of initial
convoys and the value of initial personnel and unit equipment.

PUBLIC RELATIONS:

19. The objects of publicity in connection with B.C.O.F. and
J.C.O.S.A. have been to ensure adequate and coordinated publicity
on a British Commonwealth basis, to stimulate voluntary
recruitment for B.C.O.F., to maintain public interest in the Force
and also from a 'long term' point of view, to further British
Commonwealth co-operation and co-ordination.

[matter omitted]

FRATERNISATION:

23. An approved personal instruction concerning fraternisation has
been issued by the Commander-in-Chief to all ranks of B.C.O.F.

Details of this have been forwarded to the Governments concerned.

[4]

MARRIED FAMILIES:

24. S.C.A.P. has agreed that British Commonwealth families should
be allowed to come to Japan, in conformity with the policy
concerning families of U.S. Service personnel. General Northcott
has ordered a survey of suitable accommodation in B.C.O.F. area
and is submitting recommendations on this subject to J.C.O.S.A.

MAINTENANCE:

25. Maintenance of the Force, (including the Naval Port Party) has
been arranged on the following general principles.

The stores and supplies for the initial maintenance of each
contingent are provided by the authority responsible for mounting
the contingent and despatching it to Japan. As soon as possible
the whole of B.C.O.F. will be maintained as one entity and not as
four separate contingents. It is planned to complete the
changeover to this system by 1st January, 1947. The source of
supply of each commodity for the long term maintenance plan has
been selected in relation to national economy and length of haul
to Japan. For this reason Australia has been selected as the
principal source for all commodities except petrol, and also items
which are peculiar to Indian troops and can only be obtained from
India. Responsibility for the maintenance of the whole of B.C.O.F.

is vested in the Australian Serice Headquarters. They will deal
direct with the Service Ministries or headquarters of the other
interested British Commonwealth Governments in order to ensure
complete co-ordination of the arrangements for maintaining
B.C.O.F. Details of the maintenance plan for the more important
commodities are given in the following paragraphs.

26. Australia and New Zealand eventually become the source for
almost all food supplies, except those items provided from India.

The proportion of food supplies to be provided by New Zealand is
still the subject of Government discussion. All canteen stores,
except Indian items and cigarettes, will come from Australia. U.K.

is responsible for provision of cigarettes.

27. Arrangements have been made for the bulk delivery of petroleum
spirit and diesel oil to Kure by U.S. authorities during 1946. The
subsequent source of supply is a matter for decision by the London
Petroleum Board. Provision of other oils and lubricants will be
partially from Australia and partially under U.K. arrangements
until such time as present Australian surplus military stocks have
been consumed, when presumably U.K. will be responsible for
provision for the whole of B.C.O.F.

28. Australia will after 1st January, 1947, be the source of
supply of all common user items of ordnance (excluding ammunition)
and medical stores. Other items will be laid off by Australian
Service authorities on to U.K. authorities. Ammunition will be
provided both from Australia and U.K. stocks.

29. Common user items of engineer stores will be provided from
Australia except certain building materials. These are in such
short supply that requirements for the whole force cannot be met
from Australia.

TRANSFER OF AMERICAN SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT:

30. Information originally received from Air Ministry, London,
that as from 1st March American Commanders no longer possess
authority to make transfers of supplies and equipment to our
Forces on any terms, has caused some apprehension, particularly
over the immediately pressing problem of provision of P.O.L. and
L.C.T. [5]

31. A signal has been received from the Principal Administrative
Officers Committee of the Cabinet Offices, London, stating that
the United States War Department has unofficially intimated that
it would be prepared to regard B.C.O.F. as a contingent Force
under U.S. Command, to which S.C.A.P. would have authority to
issue supplies against payment. Cabinet Offices, London, have
instructed the Joint Staff Mission, Washington, to clear this
matter officially with the American Government.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BRITISH COMMONWEALTH MISSIONS IN
TOKYO:

32. The Commander-in-Chief, B.C.O.F., has stated that, once
arrangements for the stationing of a B.C.O.F. unit in Tokyo have
been implemented, he will be able to undertake the local
administration from the Service aspect of the various British
Commonwealth Missions in Tokyo.

[matter omitted]

MOVEMENT OF B.C.O.F. (UP TO 4TH APRIL):

42. The Naval Port Party commenced arriving in Kure on 1st
February and by the end of the month the Australian and United
Kingdom/India reconnaissance parties and the Australian advance
party had arrived in Japan.

43. The Australian Liaison Mission in Tokyo closed and officially
re-opened in Kure as advanced H.Q., B.C.O.F., on 14th February.

44. General Northcott arrived in Japan on 22nd February and
established his Headquarters in Kure on 26th February. At the
request of the Australian Prime Minister he returned to Australia
on 16th March for a short visit. [6]

45. The Air Officer Commanding BCAIR arrived at Iwakuni on 8th
March to take up his command. Main Headquarters BCAIR is now
established there.

46. The following is the present position with regard to the
movement of the main formations of B.C.O.F.:

(a) The arrival of the first echelon BRINDIV, some 5,000
personnel, was complete by 1st April, with the exception of one
MT/Stores ship.

(b) The build up of the Australian contingent should be completed
by 13th April.

(c) The New Zealand contingent has arrived at Kure with the
exception of two of their MT/Stores ships, which are expected by
12th April.

(d) 73 Mustang aircraft of 81 Wing, R.A.A.F., have reached Bofu
and 7 Mustangs are still en route. 3 Mustangs and one Mosquito
escort were lost in the movement of this wing.

(e) The R.N.Z.A.F. Squadron on H.M.S. Glory arrived Kure on 23rd
March.

[matter omitted]

D. S. CLUES
Joint Secretary