Statement [1] begins.

1. The task confronting the Security Council in dealing with
international disputes such as that brought before it by Persia is
a critical one, which calls for an independent and impartial
consideration of both its functions and its procedure.

2. The present dispute concerns the Soviet Union. The Australian
delegation insists however that the course of justice before this
Council must be determined as a matter of general principle. When
the Charter was being framed at San Francisco Australia strongly
and consistently contended for the adoption of principles of
action and organisation. Illustrations of this were the veto
question and the powers of the General Assembly. In both matters
Australia found itself strongly opposed to the views of the Soviet
Union. This did not imply any policy of opposition to the Soviet
Union because in other matters the views of Australia coincided
with those of the Soviet Union. These considerations are mentioned
to show that particular matters must be dealt with on a basis of
principle otherwise the United Nations will break down.

3. Australia demands that the matter brought by the Iranian
Government to the attention of the Security Council should be
considered from this point of view and that the Soviet Union, as
the party charged, is entitled to the same degree of
consideration-no more but no less than any other member state.

4. The principles to be laid down should apply not only to this
particular case but to others which may be placed on the Agenda,
such as the question whether the existing Spanish situation
threatens international peace and security. The principles must be
such as to afford all States, great or small, just treatment at
the hands of the Security Council.

5. The fundamental approach in the view of Australia is that in
dealing with the peaceful settlement of international disputes
under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council is
essentially a quasi-judicial body. This is made clear by the rule
in Article 27 para (3) that a party to a dispute must refrain from
voting. Such a rule is characteristic of judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies. In short, the Council is intended to occupy a
position in relation to non-justiciable matters and disputes
comparable to the International Court of Justice in relation to
justiciable disputes. The Council should govern its actions and
decisions accordingly. It should administer impartial justice
according to equity and good conscience and the proved merits of
the particular case.

6. it follows that all members of the Council must come prepared
to hear and ascertain the true facts of any dispute or situation
and to deal with it in accordance with both law and justice.

Arrangements between members of the Council as to voting or the
procedure of the Council made before the facts can possibly be
fully ascertained are entirely inconsistent with the role
consigned to the Council by the Charter and should be condemned.

Equally the use of undue pressure on other States to bring a
particular matter before the Security Council or to refrain from
so doing is inconsistent with the duties of members of the
Council. Public clamour, in advance of an impartial investigation
of the facts and discussion at the Council table is also
calculated to interfere with the discharge by the Council of its
high duties.

7. For the same reason it is of supreme importance for the proper
working of the Security Council and for its public reputation as a
judicial body that its procedures should be laid down with care.

It is necessary to distinguish between different types of
disputes, in order to determine the just procedure for each. There
may be some cases in which all the relevant facts of a situation
or dispute are admitted by all the parties or members concerned.

In most cases mere assertions and counter-assertions by interested
parties will be of little or no assistance to the Council, so that
justice will require a full investigation of the disputed facts
after objective enquiry, sometimes on the spot. There will also be
cases in which some of the facts are admitted, but in which other
relevant and vital facts must be investigated and determined. It
is the Council's duty to adapt its procedures to the circumstances
before it, with a view to obtaining, not a rough summary judgment
without ascertaining all the facts but a just and lasting solution
of the basic problems involved.

8. As regards the situation in Persia, no attempt was made in
London to discuss, let alone investigate, the merits of the
matter. Both the Soviet Union and Persia finally agreed to
negotiate bilaterally. Therefore the Council merely reserved the
right to request information on the progress of the negotiations.

it should be added that the charges and countercharges made in
London could not in any event have led to a just decision on the
merits, because complex questions of law and disputed questions of
fact would have been left unsettled.

9. It now appears that the negotiations between the Soviet Union
and Iran have not been successfully concluded. indeed the
situation has become more acute because, according to the
statements made by the Persian Government Soviet troops still
remain in Persia in violation of an obligation, imposed by the
Tripartite Treaty of 29th January, 1942, to withdraw them by 2nd
March, 1946. In considering this new issue, it has to be
remembered that the Security Council may, after a full
investigation of all the facts, decide to deal not only with the
continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran but with all the
related circumstances, including any alleged justification or
excuse for the presence of the troops. Attention has to be
directed to the fact that, by Article 24 of the Charter, the
Security Council is bound to act in accordance with the purposes
of the United Nations. Those purposes bring in the conception not
only of international law, but also of justice and respect for the
principle of self-determination of peoples (See Article 1 and 2).

10. [2] In dealing with the causes of a dispute which is before
the Security Council, the Council is subject to one important
limitation on its jurisdiction imposed by Article 2 of the
Charter. The Council is forbidden to intervene in matters which
are 'essentially' within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

One result is that, as a general rule, the Security Council could
not make recommendations with regard to the internal government of
any state. Australia regards this provision as a valuable
protection for the rights of the smaller states, because each
permanent member is safeguarded by the existence of its separate
veto. But the line between matters of domestic jurisdiction and
matters of international concern is not fixed and immutable, and
it is reasonably clear that a government of Fascist origin and
tendencies may adopt policies, both at home and in its relations
with reactionary groups in other countries which will seriously
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Whether the operations of such a Fascist government are
,essentially' a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the
state concerned cannot be decided by the mere general assertion
that the form of government of a state is involved. Here again
enquiry into and investigation of the facts may be necessary
before the Council can decide whether it can deal with the matter
under the Charter. An illustration of the manner in which internal
happenings may come to be essentially of international concern may
be found in the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty
between Persia and Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of
26th February, 1921.

11. The Iranian Note to the Secretary-General of 18th March, 1946,
brings to the attention of the Security Council two matters-
(i) The presence of Soviet troops on Iranian territory after March
2nd, 1946.

(ii) The continuance of the situation referred to the Security
Council in January, 1946.

As to (i) Iran alleges a dispute between the Soviet Union and
itself. But the dispute appears to embrace other parties also,
because demands made on the Soviet Union by the United States and
the United Kingdom for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran
have not as yet been complied with. For these reasons the
procedure to be followed seems to require special consideration.

12. As regards (ii) (the situation in Iran which was referred to
the Security Council in January last), the decision of the Council
of 30th January did not automatically remit the matter to the
forthcoming meetings of the Council, even for the limited purposes
mentioned in the resolution viz., the providing of information by
the parties as to the results of the bilateral negotiations, and
the claiming by the Council of the right to request information on
the progress of the negotiations. Nevertheless in the
circumstances it would be appropriate for any member of the
Security Council to raise the question of the result of these
negotiations. No objection could be taken to the Council's
receiving a report from the parties on this matter.

13. it should be emphasised however that no conclusion adverse
either to the Soviet Union or to Iran can be drawn from the
assertions and counter assertions contained in the London
documents and proceedings. If the matter mentioned in London is to
be dealt with separately on the merits by the Council, all the
relevant facts will have to be admitted by the parties to the
dispute, or else an investigation should be conducted by or under
the authority of the Council, to ascertain what the facts are. In
truth however the original situation is practically merged in the
new dispute, occasioned by the retention of Soviet troops in Iran
since 2nd March, 1946. Its importance will be mainly as a
background to the new dispute.

14. Following upon the new dispute, (failure to withdraw Soviet
troops from Iran) the Soviet Government has asked that the meeting
of the Security Council should be postponed until 10th April. If
this means that no business whatever is to be transacted by the
Council until that date, then on the facts as known to Australia
it would seem unreasonable.

15. A just procedure would be as follows-
First, the Council should adhere to the general order of business
already determined upon, though permitting matters reserved in the
Council's resolution of 30th January [3] to be mentioned at the
outset, solely for the purpose of informing the Council as to the
present stage of the negotiations.

Second, no existing rules of procedure prevent the new dispute
from being included at once in the Agenda of the Council. The
dispute is obviously a matter of importance, and should be
included in the Agenda. However, a just procedure should be laid
down for dealing with the dispute.

Third, the Soviet Union should be asked to give an undertaking not
to take unilateral action to alter the existing position to the
prejudice of Iran.

Fourth, Iran having made a complaint in writing, the Soviet Union
should be invited to answer in writing within a reasonable time,
to be fixed by the Council.

Fifth, the Council should fix a date when the whole dispute can be
investigated by the Council itself or by a special committee of
enquiry. Once begun, the hearing should be completed with the
utmost despatch.

Sixth, the Council should take into account, in fixing the times
for the purpose of the fourth and fifth points, all the
circumstances established at the Council meeting, including the
willingness of the Soviet Union to give the undertaking referred
to in the third point.

16. Australia has no preconceived ideas as to the just settlement
of this dispute. It may be that the just settlement should be a
decision that the Soviet troops should be withdrawn immediately
and unconditionally from Iran. on the other hand, justice may
require a settlement which is not limited to the question of
breach of a particular treaty but deals as well with other aspects
of the situation in Iran. Australia cannot commit itself finally
to any view, nor should the Security Council pronounce any final
judgment until the matter has been fully investigated.