Careful consideration has been given to your letter of 15th
February 1945 [1] with regard to the Australian War Effort and
relation of the strength of the forces to the manpower conditions.

Original plans for the Philippine Campaign contemplated the
employment of one Australian division in the initial assault on
Leyte and one in the Lingayen landing. General Blamey, however,
objected to the plan, stating that he could under no circumstances
concur in the use of Australian troops unless they operated as a
corps under their own corps commander. It was impossible to
utilise the entire corps in, the initial landing force and it was
therefore necessary to amend the plan, constituting the entire
force from American divisions. Plans were then prepared with a
view to the employment of the Australian Corps for an operation
against Aparri on the northern coast of Luzon, immediately
preceding our landing at Lingayen Gulf. The developments of the
campaign, however, made it possible to move directly against
Lingayen, omitting the Aparri operation with consequent material
and vital saving in time. It was then planned to use the Corps as
the final reserve in the drive across the Central Plains north of
Manila, but the enemy weakness which developed in the tactical
situation obviated this necessity.

Current plans contemplate the elimination of the Japanese through
a series of comparatively small operations in the Central and
Southern parts of the Philippine Archipelago, employing the United
States Army troops that are now deployed in forward areas.

Concurrently with the later phase of these operations it is
proposed to attack Borneo and seize Java by over-water movement
under the protection of the bases thus established. For this
operation I have planned to use the Australian Corps under its own
commander, operating according to the practice that has
consistently been followed in the Southwest Pacific Area, under
its own task force commander reporting direct to the Commander-in-
Chief. It is estimated that the last phase of this operation, the
assault upon Java, can be launched by the end of June.

Due to recent stringent reductions in the amount of shipping that
is available to me, there has been some question with regard to
the execution of this plan. If I am permitted to use the shipping
that is available without diversion to other projects, I shall be
able to carry it out. I have made strong representations to
Washington and I am hopeful that I shall not be required to divert
means before the Netherlands East Indies campaign can be
consummated. Pending the decision which is expected momentarily,
the necessary concentrations of troops are being effected.

My purpose in projecting this campaign is to restore the
Netherlands East Indies authorities to their seat of government as
has been done within Australian and United States territory. I
consider that this is an obligation that is inherent in the
agreement of the five nations as expressed in the directive that
established the Southwest Pacific Area. Immediately upon the re-
establishment of the Netherlands East Indies government I propose
to report to the joint Chiefs of Staff that the mission of the
Southwest Pacific Area has been accomplished and recommend its
dissolution. It is contemplated thereafter that there will be a
complete reorientation and that the British Empire and the Dutch
authorities will collaborate in the complete restoration of their
respective territories.

The execution of the plan as above outlined will require not only
the full effort of available Australian ground forces but that of
American forces as well. It is proposed to support the Australian
ground forces with the R.A.A.F. Command, lending such assistance
from the United States Army Air Forces as may be required. It is
also hoped that the Seventh Fleet, including the Australian
Squadron, will be augmented for this operation by the British
Pacific Fleet.

In categorical reply to your basic question, I would state that my
plans contemplate the use of all of the Australian Forces now
assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, but that upon the
completion of the proposed campaign and dissolution of the
Southwest Pacific Area, the question of the strength of forces to
be retained, if my recommendation be followed, will be a matter
for determination by the British Empire and the highest Dutch
authorities.

The decision conveyed to me in your letter of 27th February 1945
[2] to limit the Australian component of our assault forces to the
7th and 9th Divisions has been noted. I hope you will not
eliminate entirely the possibility of using the 6th Division in
the operation outlined above if it becomes a reality.

With reference to the command organisation, we have followed a
fixed pattern since the Lae operation. The Commander-in-Chief
exercises personal and direct command of Assault forces
coordinating the action of three principal subordinates:-

(a) Naval forces under the Commander, Allied Naval Forces.

(b) Air Forces under the Commander, Allied Air Forces.

(c) Ground forces under a Task Force Commander whose organisation
is specifically prescribed according to the operation to be
undertaken. These forces may vary from a Regimental Combat Team or
Brigade Group to an Army and are commanded by an officer of
appropriate rank. In the forthcoming operation in which assault
forces will include Australian troops, it is contemplated that the
Commander would be an Australian officer. While General Morshead
[3] has been proposed and is entirely acceptable, I am prepared to
accept another officer if designated by the Australian
authorities. I consider that the assignment of the Australian
Commander should be a matter for determination by the Australians.

It is considered to be impossible, however, from an operational
viewpoint, for the officer so designated to be concerned with
command of Australian troops in New Guinea and Australia. It is
essential that the Task Force Commander remain in the field with
his troops and that he have no other duties of any kind. Any other
course of action would unquestionably jeopardize the success of
the operation and impose a risk that could not be accepted.

With reference to the R.A.A.F. Command, it is desired to have that
headquarters move forward to the operational area, but the fact
that the major portion of the administrative personnel in the
headquarters is composed of W.A.A.A.F's who under current policy
are forbidden to leave Australia has up to the present precluded
the forward movement of the headquarters. It is hoped that the
necessary administrative arrangements can be made in order to
permit Air Vice Marshal Bostock [4] to move his headquarters to a
location from which he can effectively command the R.A.A.F. in
combat.

I shall comment later upon the subject of transferring to R.A.A.F.

Headquarters of operational control of those elements of the
R.A.A.F. Command that are stationed in Australia as soon as I can
discuss the matter with General Kenney.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR