Your E.30. [1]

1. We are growing somewhat concerned about the following aspects
of the delay in receiving any answer to our communication to the
United States Government:-

(A) The despatch of the Australian component of the British
Commonwealth Force.

(B) The organisation of the arrangements, for which Australia has
accepted responsibility if the British Commonwealth Force is to be
proceeded with.

2. In regard to 1 (A), War Cabinet on 19th September [2], stressed
the importance of the time factor in organising and despatching
the Army component to Japan and directed that
(I) The initial Brigade Group is to be organised immediately in
forward areas and not on the mainland of Australia.

(II) To facilitate the organisation and despatch of the initial
Brigade Group to Japan, it is to be comprised, as far as possible,
of volunteers from the Forces in forward areas.

Our Brigade Group is expected to be concentrated at Morotai by
15th December, and the R.A.A.F. Component is ready to move. In the
absence of advice from United States Government, shipping made
available this month for movement of the Australian Forces to
Japan has had to be rejected. Other British ships have been
nominated for our use in early January, but acceptance of them
will depend on early authorisation of the movement of the Force to
Japan.

3. We view with some concern the reactions on the Forces if they
are held up indefinitely at their places of concentration. The
Service Authorities have also indicated that it will be necessary
to retain a considerable strength in the islands until the
Japanese are repatriated. The Minister for the Army has also
reported that the delay in the relief of Australian troops in
Borneo may have the result of requiring 25,000 troops, whom it was
anticipated would be available for return to Australia, to remain
in the Borneo area for the time being. There has also been
criticism from the public and the Forces regarding the prospective
rate of demobilisation.

4. With reference to 1 (B), there is considerable work involved in
the organisation of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, in
establishing the control and planning machinery which will be
representative of the participating countries and in making the
plans for the organisation, control and maintenance of the Force.

5. You will recall that, when proposals were under consideration
for a British Commonwealth Force to participate in the invasion of
the Japanese Home Islands, we emphasised the importance of the
fact that, in view of the part played by Australia in the war
against Japan, we must press on with our participation in the
final offensive, even if the arrival of other components of the
British Commonwealth Force might be delayed. The same principle
would appear to have equal force on this occasion. The New Zealand
component has to come from Italy, and the British and Indian
components may be delayed by shortage of shipping or commitments
in the South East Asia Area.

6. It would therefore appear, irrespective of whether the set-up
asked for is approved or whether it is modified in accordance with
General MacArthur's views, if they are supported by the United
States Chiefs of Staff, that authority should be given for the
despatch of the Australian Land and Air components without
prejudice to the ultimate decision on the organisation of the
Force. I shall be glad if you could obtain this as soon as
possible when it is proposed that an advance party of the
Commander-in-Chief's Staff should proceed to Japan to make
preliminary arrangements for the reception of the Force. The
organisation of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief and the
establishment of the control and planning must, of course, await
the decision on the organisation of the Force.