Skip to main content

Historical documents

379 Ball to Burton

Cablegram 4 BATAVIA, 10 November 1945

TOP SECRET

I have seen Foote [1] who was most cordial. Makes gloomy
prediction. Believes Nationalists represent only small articulate
minority but heavily armed and led by German and Japanese Agents.

Believes immediate problem not ultimately complete ownership of
these Islands but urgent human need to save 40,000 Europeans from
massacre, hence believes immediate show of Allied force necessary,
deplored the fact that the American Government too sentimental to
accept his expert advice.

2. I saw Van Mook. Though knew him in Melbourne failed to
recognize him, grey, lined, depressed. He said yesterday he
anticipated meeting Soekarno this morning. His manner coldly
formal. My efforts to draw him only brought reply 'that is too
complicated to discuss'. His proud empty palace like a marble
sepulchre. Our meeting lasted three minutes.

3. I saw Soekarno this morning, he received me most cordially with
the Vice President Hatta, Foreign Minister Soebardjo, Information
Sjarifuddin and other Cabinet Colleagues, everything discussed was
taken down by shorthand writer. I said:-

(1) That my Government felt the deepest interest in developments
in the Netherlands East Indies and had sent me here to seek
information from every available source;

(2) That my Government was interested not only because of our
Pacific dependence for defence, but because it was anxious to see
great advance in the economic, social and educational standards of
our neighbours in the Pacific. I referred to Dr. Evatt's efforts
in pushing the Social and Economic Council at San Francisco.

Soekarno expressed great appreciation of us and said that was why
he had appealed to Dr. Evatt to stimulate the United Nations
initiative in the settlement of the dispute;

(3) That my Government was deeply anxious for the physical safety
of European internees and prisoners-of-war.

In reply to a question I said-
(4) That very many people in Australia were sympathetic with the
aspirations of the Indonesians. Soekarno said he greatly deplored
violence and harm to anyone. He was going to Djogjakarta tomorrow
to tell a Nationalist youth rally that they would control
extremists and avoid bloodshed.

Soekarno urged that all uniformed Dutch be temporarily removed
from Java until the United Nations Commission enquiry made
recommendations. Soekarno would greatly welcome any Australian
Government initiative to secure the immediate establishment of the
Regional United Nations Enquiry Commission.

He did not believe the forthcoming bilateral Conference under
Christison could produce result since Van Mook's statement on
November 5th wholly unacceptable. [2]

Soekarno, was preparing to entertain Isaac [3] and myself at
morning coffee but I took my leave with the assurance his
residence would always be open to me. All the Cabinet came to
farewell us at car.

My impression is that Soekarno, and Colleagues are academic
idealists with considerable psychological sensibility but little
executive capacity and decisiveness. They are acutely vulnerable
to world opinion.

I most earnestly urge that the Australian Government take
immediate steps to secure United Nations action emphasizing
American interest and playing down British interests. I believe
the next few days will give us a great opportunity. Leadership
here should not be left to Britain since she has become too
closely associated with the Dutch in Indonesia.

Later saw Christison and Dening. They gave the impression no
prospect of success of the conference. Dening claimed membership
of Russia and China to any United Nations Commission would destroy
the value of this approach.

1 U.S. Consul-General in Batavia.

2 The English text of Van Mook's 'Declaration of Policy of the
Netherlands East Indies Government' is contained in Addison's
cablegram G7, dispatched 9 November (on file AA : A1838/2,
403/2/2/2, i).

3 Ball's secretary and interpreter.


[AA : A1838/2, 401/1/2/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
Back to top