THE AUSTRALIAN WAR EFFORT
THE RELATION OF THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES TO THE MANPOWER
POSITION GENERALLY

1. ATTEMPTS TO RECTIFY THE DISEQUILIBRIUM WHICH STILL EXISTS
Since my discussions with you in June 1943 [1] regarding the re-
balancing of the War Effort as a consequence of your advice of the
removal of the threat of invasion to Australia, constant efforts
have been made to adjust the disequilibrium that has prevailed. As
previously explained, this situation had arisen from the extensive
call up of manpower in 1942 for the Forces and to provide for
urgent operational works and the diversion of manpower and
resources to provide food, supplies and services for the rapidly
increasing forces in the Southwest Pacific Area.

In October 1943, War Cabinet directed the release of 20,000 men
from the Army and 20,000 persons from Munitions and Aircraft
Production. In August 1944, War Cabinet directed the release of a
further 30,000 men from the Army and 15,000 from the Air Force.

The Defence Committee has also established regular reviews of the
Australian and American programmes for munitions, aircraft and
works, to ensure that they do not exceed essential requirements.

Limits have been fixed to the food requirements that can be
supplied to the people of Britain and to Allied Forces in the
Pacific. Nevertheless, it was reported to a recent meeting of War
Cabinet in a review of the present manpower position:-

'That the commitments at present undertaken in the military,
indirect war and civilian aspects of the Australian War Effort are
beyond the capacity of our manpower to carry out.' [2]

2. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT POSITION
The background of the present manpower position may be summarised
as follows in regard to the military aspect of the Australian War
Effort:-

(i) The arrangement made by me with Mr. Churchill, President
Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff when I was abroad, for
the maintenance of the following strengths:-

(a) In the case of the Army, six divisions and two armoured
brigades for active operations.

(b) The Royal Australian Navy to be maintained at its present
strength, plus additions arising from the Australian naval
construction programme.

(c) The maintenance of the Royal Australian Air Force at the
strength of 53 squadrons to be achieved under the present
programme.

(ii) On my return, the future strength of the Australian Military
Effort was discussed with you in June, when you emphasised the
importance of being able to fulfil what we attempted, because of
the reliance that must be placed on our contribution in the plans
that were being prepared. Greater emphasis was laid by you on the
certainty of fulfilment of any promise that we made rather than on
the size of the force promised.

I also discussed with you the use of the Australian Forces, and
said that the Government and people of Australia were anxious that
their forces should be associated with your advance and should be
represented in your then impending offensive operations.

(iii) At the meeting of the Advisory War Council on 5th July, the
matter having previously been discussed by War Cabinet, it was
decided that, in regard to your forthcoming operations against the
Philippines, there should be no variation in the existing
assignment to you of operational control of the Australian Defence
Forces. [3]

(iv) On 12th July, a directive was issued by you for the re-
distribution of the land forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, in
order to make available forces with which to continue the
offensive. The directive provided for:-

(a) The Australian Forces to assume the responsibility for the
continued neutralisation of the Japanese in Australian and British
territory and Mandates in the Southwest Pacific Area, exclusive of
the Admiralties.

(b) The allotment of two A.I.F. divisions for participation in the
offensive.

3. THE RELATION OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S PLANS TO THE STRENGTH
OF THE AUSTRALIAN FORCES
In its recent review, War Cabinet reached the conclusion that, as
you had made your operational plans on the assigned strength of
the Australian Forces, it would be impossible to make further
reductions in the strength at this stage if your plans are being
adhered to, and I was requested by War Cabinet to ascertain if
such is the case. [4]

If there has been no variation in your plans, I was asked to
consult you regarding the contemplated use of the Australian
Forces, with a view to determining the stage at which appropriate
reductions can be made and deciding the future strengths which
should be maintained. As the war effort is still in a state of
disequilibrium, War Cabinet considered that. the earliest
opportunity should be taken to rectify it as soon as the
operational situation will permit.

However, since War Cabinet reviewed the position, I have been
informed by General Blamey [5] that your recent request to
Washington for the retention of certain shipping to move the 1st
Australian Corps to staging areas in preparation for further
operations, has not been accepted. It is understood that this
attitude is in accordance with the priority allotted to further
operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, after the capture of the
Philippines, in relation to the war in Europe.

Elements of the 1st Australian Corps have been on the mainland for
periods of up to eighteen months and have taken no part in the war
since 1943. You may have gathered from press reports that there
has been considerable public criticism of the inactivity of the
Australian Land Forces which, in a large degree, has arisen from
the members of the Forces themselves, a considerable number of
whom have been under arms for four and five years. The
prescription for victory laid down for the Australian people has
been that they must either fight or work, and my reply to public
demands for the easing of restrictions and shortages involving the
release of additional men from the Forces has been that the
maintenance of the strength of the fighting forces is the first
priority.

In view of the great stringency of the manpower position and the
heavy pressure that is being brought to bear on the Government to
remedy manpower shortages and lift restrictions, I shall be
confronted with a difficult situation if so many Australian troops
are to be retained in an ineffective role, for it would appear
that an all out effort against Japan is unlikely for a
considerable period.

It would also seem that when such an effort is mounted, the forces
allotted by the respective Allied nations will be much less than
the totals now being utilised for the war in the various theatres
in Europe and Asia. If these premises are correct, then it would
seem that Australia's allocation of forces should be considerably
reduced.

A similar position obtains in the case of the R.A.A.F., my latest
information indicating that enemy air forces in the whole of the
East Indies area have been greatly reduced, and that the United
Nations have overwhelming air superiority. In addition to the
R.A.A.F. squadrons assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, there
are 19,000 air personnel serving overseas.

No reduction can be made in the Australian Naval Forces. The
squadron has suffered the loss of three out of five cruisers, of
which only one has been replaced. In addition, there have been
losses of smaller ships, and the Government considers that the
strength should be restored, and possibly increased, as one of the
most effective ways in which we can maintain a satisfactory
fighting effort in the advance against Japan.

4. INDIRECT WAR COMMITMENTS
In addition to the maintenance of the manpower strength of the
Australian Forces, our other commitments cover the following
field:-

To maintain the material needs of the Australian Forces.

To provide an appropriate contribution to the material needs of
the United States Forces.

To provide an appropriate contribution to the material needs of
the United Kingdom Forces which may he based on Australia.

To provide for the essential needs of the civilian population on
standards appropriate to the present stage of the war, and the
civilian standards of the countries whose forces will be supplied
from Australian sources.

To provide for the maintenance of food exports to the United
Kingdom (including India) at the level agreed upon, viz. the 1944
scale.

To provide for the production of such goods as may otherwise be
approved for export.

The volume of reciprocal aid for the year ending 30th June is
estimated at 110,000,000 and, in addition, War Cabinet has
approved of programmes for works and supplies for the Royal Navy
totalling 26,186,100 of which 10,700,000 for foodstuffs is a
matter of allocation within the United Kingdom 1945 food
programme. The manpower required to meet the other additional
commitments for the Royal Navy, except works, is stated to be more
than offset in an overall sense by reductions in the demands of
the Australian and United States Forces. In the case of works, the
programme is being met by the deferment of releases from the
labour force employed by the Allied Works Council, by the return
of workers released for seasonal employment, and by the diversion
of labour from less urgent works. However, the nett result is an
additional demand on our limited manpower, but, in view of the
representations for the despatch of British Naval Forces to the
Pacific, which were strongly supported by yourself as Commander-
in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area, the Government felt bound
to co-operate in doing everything possible to contribute towards
their needs. I wrote to you recently on the importance of American
representation on the Defence Department machinery which deals
with the demands of the Australian, American and British Forces.

Finally, it would therefore appear that, after the defeat of
Germany, Australia, on the present basis of her effort will be
under greater strain in relation to her resources than the other
United Nations. She entered the war in 1939. Except for continued
participation in the air war in Europe, her military effort since
Japan entered the war has been concentrated in the Pacific. She
will therefore experience no direct relief on the defeat of
Germany, as will the nations fighting in Europe.

5. REQUEST TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
I would recall the following extract from the enclosure to my
letter
of 1st November [6]:-

'The Government considers it to be a matter of vital importance to
the future of Australia and her status at the peace table in
regard to the settlement in the Pacific, that her military effort
should be concentrated as far as possible in the Pacific and that
it should be on a scale to guarantee her an effective voice in the
peace settlement.'
I need hardly add that these views are still the Policy of the
Government whose immediate aim is to establish a better balance
between the direct and indirect aspects of the War Effort. It is
felt, however, that if considerations of global strategy are to
retard the use of our Forces, it is illogical to keep inactive so
large a part of our manpower for so long, when part of it could be
making a greater contribution to the Allied War Effort in other
directions where our manpower needs are so pressing.

I shall be grateful if you will furnish me with your observations
on the various points I have raised in so far as they relate to
your responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest
Pacific Area, and if you will also let me have your views on the
relation of the strength of the Australian Forces to your plans in
the Southwest Pacific Area. In view of my previous discussions
with Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of
Staff on the dimensions of the Australian War Effort, I feet that
I should acquaint them with the manpower position with which the
Government is confronted, and its views on the course it should
follow in the light of the prospective operational position that
you will outline to me.

JOHN CURTIN
Minister for Defence