Your cablegram 349 of 1st September. [1]

1. We have carefully considered your further proposals for the
organisation of a British Commonwealth Force to participate in the
occupation of Japan.

2. At the outset we should like to make it clear that the
Government fully recognises and, indeed, has consistently
advocated the importance of the maintenance of the prestige of the
British Commonwealth in the Pacific. We would refer to our
cablegram No. 267 of 8th October, 1943 [2], relative to the
Australian War Effort, in which we expressed the following
opinions:-

'(i) The Government considers it to be a matter of vital
importance to the future of Australia and her status at the peace
table in regard to the settlement in the Pacific, that her
military effort should be concentrated as far as possible in the
Pacific, and that it should be on a scale to guarantee her an
effective voice in the peace settlement.

(ii) The interests at stake in this paramount question are not
those of Australia alone. They also include those of the British
Empire in the Pacific. The Commonwealth Government considers it to
be very essential that the Governments of the United Kingdom,
Canada and New Zealand in particular, should understand the vital
importance of the extent of the military effort that should be
maintained in the Pacific by Australia alone or in association
with other parts of the Empire. If the defeat of Japan is to await
the end of the war in Europe, the struggle in the Pacific will be
more prolonged, and it is imperative that a certain minimum effort
should be maintained by or on behalf of the British Empire in the
Pacific.'
3. The late Prime Minister, in the course of his discussions in
London in May, 1944, emphasised the importance of re-establishing
the prestige of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific which had
been mainly upheld by the Australian War Effort. In co-operation
in Imperial Defence, Australia has consistently played a positive
part and, as you are doubtless aware, through the late Prime
Minister, it sponsored proposals for improvement in the machinery
of Empire Co-operation. [3] 4. Our war effort is the practical
demonstration of our views and, we suggest, is convincing evidence
of what we have done to further the cause of the British
Commonwealth in the Pacific. We feel strongly that, in the
military, as well as in the political tasks and responsibilities
arising from the Japanese surrender, Australia is entitled to a
degree of recognition and status that is fairly and justly
commensurate with the contribution which we have made to the final
victory over Japan. As stated in our cablegram 240 of 17th August
[4], we have accepted the additional military commitments outlined
therein as a separate belligerent of Japan, and as a primary, and
not as a secondary Pacific power.

5. We consider that the Australian Force to serve in Japan should
operate on the same basis as our Forces have operated in the South
West Pacific Area in the past, that is with direct responsibility
to General MacArthur.

6. It is noted that Canada and South Africa will not be associated
with the proposed British Commonwealth Force and also that units
of the British Pacific Fleet in Japanese waters are to remain
under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, British
Pacific Fleet. The Force will not therefore be fully
representative of the British Commonwealth, nor will it be a
unified force under one Commander-in-Chief.

7. We have informed General MacArthur of our desire to organise an
independent Australian Force to serve in Japan [5] and, although
no final arrangements have yet been made, we have no doubt that
General MacArthur will co-operate fully with us in allotting to
the Australian Force a role appropriate to our status and the
contribution which we have made to the victory in the Pacific.

8. We regret therefore that we are unable to concur in your
proposals, and wish to adhere to the arrangements for the
organisation of an independent Australian Force communicated in
our cablegram No. 240 of 17th August.