Your 344 [1] and 347 [2]. Portuguese Timor Surrender.

1. We note your concurrence in our proposal that surrender be
taken by an Australian force and arrangements have now been made
with Lord Mountbatten for this purpose.

2. Suggestion in paragraph 6 (C) of our 256 [3] arose from our
wish to anticipate difficulties of a confused situation. We
foresee a need for some assistance to the Portuguese until
effective Portuguese control is re-established and wish to avoid
any subsequent misunderstanding with Portuguese in connection with
this. Australian operations in Timor during 1942 have given us
special knowledge and experience of local conditions. Surrender
and handing over should be regarded as logical sequel of
Australian military activities in Timor. To the best of our
knowledge Portuguese are not in a position to re-establish
effective civil control immediately. Moreover there is already
evidence of war crimes committed in Timor and we should be in a
position to secure investigation and other necessary measures.

3. We would therefore propose that the withdrawal of our force
should not take place immediately after the surrender but when
Portuguese authority has been effectively established.

4. Portugal has not been at war with Japan and has no claim to
accept or participate in acceptance of surrender. We are however
willing that the Governor [4] should be present at the surrender
formalities as representing Portuguese civil authorities.

Portuguese armed forces have taken no part in the war and there is
no reason for their association with the surrender. Their role now
should be confined to taking over from our force at a time to be
fixed by mutual agreement. It would be highly incongruous if
Portugal, which has been an acquiescent spectator in the Pacific
War, were to be more than a spectator at the surrender to a victor
state. Prestige of victorious powers must wherever possible be re-
established by overt acts throughout the Pacific. The arrangements
in respect of other territories in this area suggested to us by
Mountbatten's representative are designed with this end in view.

5. We originally sent forces into Portuguese Timor at your request
and when the Portuguese protested we allowed the objection to be
directed against Australia in order to help you in Europe. [5]
Further, in order to help in connection with the Azores Agreement,
we acquiesced in the recognition of Portuguese sovereignty, but
this was on the distinct understanding that there should be
conversations between Portugal and Australia with a view to
defence and economic arrangements respecting Portuguese Timor. [6]
There would be complete lack of justice and frankness if these
conversations were postponed indefinitely instead of being taken
up immediately.

6. As you will be aware from earlier communications it is our view
that Portuguese vacillation and timidity in the face of Japanese
aggression have shown them to be unfit to be entrusted with
defence of territory so important to the security of this area. In
our opinion there is much to be said for this solution of placing
this territory under the Trusteeship system of the United Nations
with emphasis on the security clauses of that system. The consent
of Portugal to this course would be necessary but it should be
obtainable since there would be no derogation from the sovereignty
of the parent state. We suggest these questions can be discussed
fully with Evatt after his arrival in England.

7. For these reasons we think you should help us to resist any
action for precipitate re-establishment of the mere status quo
without regard to our bitter experiences in the Pacific war. We
are prepared to delay temporarily departure of our force, provided
you also delay movement of Portuguese forces. The representative
of the victorious powers should not be embarrassed by the untimely
arrival of these forces which we recollect left Lourenco Marques
in 1942 to assert Portuguese sovereignty but retreated as soon as
they ascertained that the operation would be difficult. [7] Nor
should any delay on our part permit the Japanese by handing over
to the Portuguese to save face and support their pretence that
they occupied Timor only to protect the Portuguese.

8. We are most anxious that your approach to the Portuguese
Government should conform with the above and would appreciate
earliest possible advice so that surrender can be taken by
Australian force within the next few days. Meanwhile our military
preparations are complete.