Your 319, Portuguese Timor. [1]

1. We would like your early consideration of the immediate
position likely to arise in Portuguese Timor. This territory in
hostile hands can always provide a very real menace to Australia
as was shown by the fact that many Japanese air attacks on
Northern Australia were based on or staged through Timor.

2. In 1943 a tentative arrangement for post-war relations with the
Portuguese in this colony was arrived at between Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Eden and Dr. Evatt and we understand it received the approval
of the Portuguese Government. [2] By this arrangement important
priorities in relation to defence, trade and communications were
to be accorded to Australia although Portuguese sovereignty was
not impaired.

3. The Portuguese failed us completely in the arrangement made for
the defence of Timor with their concurrence and as a result our
forces were left to sustain single-handed in Timor for a long
period an epic guerrilla warfare which had an important effect on
operations in the area.

4. Now we learn that the Portuguese are trying to capitalise at
once on Allied successes by the despatch of the two sloops
referred to in your telegram. It is obvious that the surrender of
this territory should be made to Australian forces who alone
defended it. We consider that if at all possible the Portuguese
sloops should not be allowed to go forward until the Japanese
surrender to an Australian force to be despatched has been
effected and also that Australian forces should be maintained
until a satisfactory arrangement has been come to with the
Portuguese Government with a view to fulfilling all the objectives
outlined in the 1943 proposals.

5. An important point in our consideration of this matter is of
course the welfare of the native people of Portuguese Timor which
has been notoriously neglected by the administration. We submit
that in this territory and elsewhere in the South West Pacific,
surrender arrangements should not prejudice readjustments found
desirable in the interests of security and welfare always subject
naturally to the consent of the Powers concerned.

6. We would summarise our views as follows:

(a) The Japanese surrender in Portuguese Timor should be made to
Australian forces.

(b) That meanwhile no facilities be given for the despatch of
Portuguese forces to the colony.

(c) That interim arrangements for the restoration of
administration, communications etc. should be made direct between
the Australian forces of occupation and whatever local Portuguese
administration is still in existence.

(d) That these interim arrangements should be with a view to the
conclusion of a long term arrangement with the Portuguese
Government including as a minimum the objectives of the 1943
understanding.

7. If you concur we would be grateful if in the first instance you
would obtain the Portuguese Government's acquiescence in the
arrangements suggested in (a) and (c) above.