We have been considering arrangements for the Control and
Occupation of Japan.

The following summarises the position as we see it.

2. British Forces of Occupation are unlikely to be much larger
than four or five Brigades. United States forces are likely to be
of the Order of 22 Divisions. There would thus be a great
disadvantage in basing the British share in political and economic
control on the comparative size of Occupation Forces although it
would be necessary to ensure that full weight is given to advice
of the British senior representative on the spot.

3. It follows that control by means of National Zones under a
Council of Commanders as in Germany and Austria would not suit
British interests since the British Commander would carry little
weight in comparison with the United States Commander. In any
case, it would be difficult for us to discharge the responsibility
of procuring transport, distributing civil supplies and finding
requisite Military Government Staff for a British Zone. General
Occupation duties for Japan should therefore be undertaken by the
United States Forces.

4. For reasons of prestige however, the Prefecture of Tokyo as the
Seat of the Japanese Government should be garrisoned jointly by
the United States, the British, the Soviet and the Chinese
contingents though not necessarily zoned like Berlin. United
States forces should be responsible for making available necessary
local supplies for the whole area of Tokyo including garrison
forces. The Japanese should not be allowed to transfer the Seat of
Government elsewhere.

5. No information is available about the Soviet or the Chinese
views on Occupation and Control. Russia will probably wish to play
a dominant part in the Occupation of Manchuria and Korea but is
also likely to claim an equal voice in the control of Japan. China
will no doubt wish to send at least a token force to Japan and
likewise to have an equal voice. We consider it imperative that
Russia and China should not be given a greater share in the
occupation of Japan than our own.

6. If there is not to be a Supreme Control Council of Commanders
as in Germany we consider that some other form of Allied Control
Council should be established for the four Islands of Metropolitan
Japan, comprising representatives of the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China as the great Powers
principally concerned with Japan. In view of Australian interest
in the Pacific, the Australian part in the war against Japan and
the expressed wish of the Australian Government to participate in
the control of Japan, we consider that Australia should also be
invited to be represented on the Council. The Control Council
should be responsible for the formulation of policy towards Japan,
each of the members receiving instructions from and reporting
direct to his own Government. It should be for each Government to
decide whether its representative should be civilian or military.

Execution of policy would be the responsibility of the Supreme
Allied Commander who should exercise control through the Japanese
authorities. Since the Supreme Commander is to exercise his
authority on behalf of the Allied Powers and not for the United
States alone he should be the President of the Control Council.

Any decisions which could not be reached locally should be
referred to the Governments for settlement through such channels
as they may decide. Each member could be assisted by a personal
staff of technical advisers. In the case of military and economic
disarmament, reparations, and other matters requiring direct
supervision of occupying powers, it would be advisable for
representatives of each member to be included in or attached to
executive departments under the Supreme Allied Commander which
were responsible for executing policy of the Control Council.

7. In purely military matters so far as British Occupation Forces
were concerned the British Commander should have direct access to
the Supreme Commander and should not be responsible to the United
Kingdom member of the Council.

8. A number of other countries including other British
Commonwealth countries are interested in the control of Japan but
if all these were added to the Control Council it would become an
unwieldy and inefficient body. We consider that countries not on
the proposed Control Council but who have engaged actively in war
against Japan should be invited to constitute with the countries
represented on the Control Council an Advisory Committee to the
Supreme Allied Commander. These countries should be Canada, New
Zealand, South Africa, India, France, Netherlands and the
Philippines. The President of the Control Council should also be
Chairman of the Advisory Committee. The functions of the Committee
would be to consider control matters referred to them by the
Control Council and to make recommendations to the Control
Council. The Committee should be kept fully informed of policy
matters under consideration by the Council.