Your D.1408. [1] You will have now received our telegram 225 [2]
which states our general impression of the very difficult and
important problem involved. The essentials are in our view that
the Emperor should have no immunity from responsibility for
Japan's acts of aggression and proved war crimes, that the Emperor
should be personally identified with the acceptance of surrender,
and that the future of the Imperial throne should be regarded as a
question to be decided later by the Japanese people on conditions
to be determined.

The attempted Japanese reservation appears to us to be either a
device to preserve the Japanese militaristic structure
fundamentally unchanged or an endeavour to provoke disunity of
view among the Allied powers. We believe it, however, of the first
importance among the war aims against Japan that the present
Imperial-Militarist system be not only discredited but completely
broken and that clear recognition be given to the supreme Allied
authority over Japan.

If the present system remains unaffected the Japanese people will
be unable to appreciate their defeat. The visible dethronement of
the system is a primary means of shaking the faith of the Japanese
in the heavenly character of the Emperor in whose name they have
committed many atrocities. Unless the system goes the Japanese
will remain unchanged and recrudescence of aggression in the
Pacific will only be postponed to a later generation.

At your request and that of the United States Government we
postponed publication of the details of the war crimes and
atrocities revealed in the report by Chief Justice Webb which is
now before the War Crimes Commission [3]. A summary of this is now
being made, but in the meantime we would ask you to consult with
Lord Wright, the Australian Representative on the Commission, as
to the general nature of the evidence. In our view it discloses a
deliberate system of terrorism and atrocity which must have been
known to the supreme authorities in Japan not excluding the
Emperor. It would be a very difficult matter to justify
discrimination in this respect as between Hitler and his
associates on the one hand and Hirohito and his associates on the
other.

For these reasons we are opposed to the acceptance of surrender on
the understanding which the Japanese are attempting to attach to
the Potsdam terms. Of course a different situation would arise if
the Japanese message were interpreted as meaning only a temporary
retention of purely formal authority. While the Emperor should be
retained at the moment in order that he should be expressly
associated with the surrender, it should be clearly understood by
the Japanese that this carries no commitment whatever by the
Allies and that the person of the Emperor is to be regarded as at
the disposal of the Allied Governments in the same way as each and
every other person of the surrendering enemy state.

The difficulties we are now confronting are in our submission due
partly to the fact that we were not consulted prior to the issue
of the Potsdam document [4]. All of us are put in a difficult
position because of the lack of personal consultation in these
matters, which are of such vital importance to Australia. We are
convinced that even the full elaboration of views by telegram is
no substitute for frank preliminary consultation.

The Potsdam ultimatum did, however, mean that the only acceptable
answer was unconditional surrender, and it appears that the enemy
is now trying to impose a condition or else obtain a peace by
negotiation. It is inconsistent with well settled policy to agree
in advance of surrender to the acceptance of any condition
whatsoever.