My immediately preceding telegram. [1] Following is a general
summary of our views on the policy towards Siam.

1. (A) Siam by failing to resist Japan accelerated the
overwhelming of Malaya and Burma;

(B) Her alliance with Japan was a flagrant violation of the Anglo-
Siamese non-aggression treaty of 1940. [2]

2. Consequently our normal course would be to call for
unconditional surrender and it would be justifiable, prima facie,
to require full restitution and reparation together with
guarantees of future good behaviour.

3. On the other hand the Pibul Government which signed the
alliance with Japan has been overthrown and movement against Japan
is under way [3], the leaders of which have in accordance with our
advice refrained hitherto from action which might be premature. A
situation may well develop in which we shall be dealing with a
Government which will have repudiated Japanese connection with the
intention of collaborating with us in the expulsion of Japanese.

The Government will undoubtedly have the entire sympathy and
support of the United States Government who have said (my telegram
D1223 paragraph 5 [4]) that they will recognise and resume
diplomatic relations with the Siamese Government when conditions
which led to non-recognition are removed. The Chinese Government
may also be expected to regard such a Siamese Government with
benevolence.

4. None of this need, or should, prevent us from securing just
redress for injuries done to British interests but-
(A) Neither military nor non-military means of pressure will be
easy to apply without the co-operation of the United States
Government;

(B) The willing co-operation of a genuinely friendly Siamese
Government will be necessary to us both if we are to acquire the
maximum quantities of Siamese rice (which will be necessary for
the relief of other Countries liberated from Japan), and also in
conclusion of eventual security arrangements in South East Asia.

5. The agreement to be concluded with the Siamese Liberation
Government will differ from an armistice based on unconditional
surrender in that once it is concluded it will not be open to us
to impose further conditions. The agreement must therefore be
sufficiently comprehensive both to liquidate the state of war and
also provide the foundation for future co-operation with Siam.

6. A particularly important subject is rice (see section D
paragraph 12 of draft conditions [5]). To meet current shortages
it is vital to secure the Siamese rice surplus which cannot,
however, be bought without greatly increasing [price],
consequently we believe the course best designed to secure a
maximum possible amount of rice is-
(A) To invoke the analogy of Mutual Aid and demand substantial
contribution of rice from the Siamese Government as a free gift
toward the Allied war effort as a counterpart to arms and
munitions which might be made available for Siamese use against
Japan and
(B) To obtain for repayment maximum supplies available in
addition. Allocation of financial benefit of free rice would be
subject to special negotiation between receiving Nations but [6]
distribution would be effected in accordance with ordinary
Combined Food Board procedure.

7. Form and time of agreement. It would clearly be convenient if
any agreement could be signed by Admiral Mountbatten as Supreme
Allied Commander, South East Asia, on behalf of all Governments
concerned. But apart from any other consideration it would be
difficult for him to act on behalf of Governments who are at war
with Siam and of United States Government who are not. We feel
therefore that any agreement which he signs will have to be
restricted to matters germane to his responsibility as an Allied
Commander. But any such military agreement will have to be
preceded by a political agreement which may have to be concluded
with great urgency in order to facilitate military operations. For
this reason we consider that political agreement (which is so
worded, however, as to cover allied interests where restitution
and conservation are concerned) should be purely British in the
first instance (but without excluding the possibility of parallel
United States and perhaps French agreements). Actual terms
contained in my immediately following telegram [7] represent the
minimum which we should be prepared to accept but we propose to
leave over to actual negotiations settlement of exact form of
agreement. Broadly speaking what we have in mind is that it should
cover the whole field in general terms with the provision that
certain questions e.g. military action to be taken and military
aid to be furnished by Siam and question of rice shall form the
subject of Siam's existing assets in sterling and their foreign
exchange. To exact rice required as reparation would be reasonable
in enemy territory but would be an inappropriate procedure vis-a-
vis a Siamese Liberation Government. Separate detailed agreements
with Supreme Allied Commander or other appropriate authority and
others (e.g. Trade Agreements) would be negotiated in detail at
later stage.

8. As regards France we would propose to notify the French
Provisional Government in advance of terms which we propose to
present to Siam explaining the operational urgency which may
necessitate immediate agreement and pointing out that the
agreement will safeguard French interests (including in particular
return of Indo-Chinese territory ceded under Japanese award of May
1941 [8]) and is without prejudice to any parallel agreement which
French may decide to negotiate.

9. As regards China on security grounds we should not propose to
inform Chinese Government of our proposals until Siamese
Liberation Government is on point of declaring itself.