CANBERRA, 28 June 1945
TOP SECRET
AGENDUM NO. 245/1945-BASING OF NETHERLANDS FORCES ON AUSTRALIA
The following decision [1] was taken on the recommendation of the
Advisory War Council:-
(1) In Minute No. 3807 of 21st September, 1944 [2], War Cabinet
approved that the attitude of the Commonwealth Government to the
approach by the Netherlands Government for the basing of a
Netherlands Force on Australia be defined as follows:-
(a) The proposal of the Netherlands Government for the basing of a
Netherlands Force of approximately 30,000 troops on Australia
commends itself to the Commonwealth Government, in principle, and
the Government is willing to provide facilities and assistance as
may be practicable in the light of its existing and potential
commitments.
(b) As a first step, it will be necessary to ascertain what is
involved in accommodating, training and maintaining the proposed
Netherlands Force, as well as financial and other detailed
arrangements, in order that the proposal may be related to the
Government's existing and potential commitments.
(2) The report of the Defence Committee (Minute No. 106/1945 of
27th March) indicates that the provision of the requirements of
this Force will absorb manpower to the extent of several
thousands. It was noted that the Defence Committee decided not to
make any recommendation upon the question whether N.E.I. Forces
should be based on and trained in Australia.
(3) In the meantime, the Government, on 31st May, decided to
reduce the strength of the Australian Army and Air Force by
54,000, which figure was increased to 64,000 on 28th June, the
primary objective of this reduction being to restore a proper
balance between the direct military effort and its industrial
basis appropriate to the present and immediately prospective stage
of the war. The Government's policy on Allied commitments was
recorded in Minute No. (4223) of 31st May 1945, and stated to
Parliament by the Acting Prime Minister on 1st June as follows:-
'It has been made clear from the start, that there are
considerable limitations on Australia's capacity to accept
additional commitments for the maintenance of Forces from
Australian sources of manpower and materials. It is of vital
importance to other Governments that we should not make promises
which we cannot fulfil. It is of equal importance to the
Commonwealth that it should not undertake commitments which are
beyond the capacity of its resources to provide. It is the duty of
the Production Executive to consider Allied proposals in relation
to other aspects of the war effort, in order to assess the
capacity to provide for them. To guard against the neutralisation
of the measures being taken to establish equilibrium in the war
effort, the Production Executive has been requested to fix
ceilings for the Allied commitments that can be undertaken.'
(4) In a separate Minute (No. (4292)) [3] 'Review of the Works
Programmes for the Royal Navy' it has been decided, in view of the
imperative needs of the housing situation, its manpower and
material requirements, and the measures being taken to restore a
proper balance between the direct military effort and its
industrial basis appropriate to the present and immediately
prospective stage of the war, that no additional works commitments
are to be accepted for the Royal Navy unless:-
(a) They can be met by the diversion of manpower at present
employed by the Allied Works Council which cannot be diverted to
housing.
(b) Revisions can be made in the present Royal Navy works
programme which can be carried out by the present labour bloc
employed on the Royal Navy works, after providing for the
reduction in strength which has been in suspense, and the further
reduction which is to be effected by the end of 1945.
It was noted that commitments totalling over 25-millions have
already been accepted for the Royal Navy.
(5) It is now evident that the existing and potential commitments
referred to in Minute No. (3807) of 21st September, 1944, preclude
the acceptance of commitments involving demands on Australian
manpower as outlined in the Defence Committee's report for a Force
of 30,000 men. In regard to the Force of 5,600, the Government is
unable to accept any commitment at present and desires to be
informed of the precise manpower commitment involved for the
various classes of requirements. [4] The needs proposed to be met
from Service stocks are to be shown clearly, together with an
indication as to whether they will be provided from surplus stocks
or will entail additional production for replacements.
[AA : A2673, VOL. 16]