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109 Evatt to Chifley

Cablegram E47 [SAN FRANCISCO], 11 June 1945, 11.10 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET

Delegation telegram SFC51.

Your 102. [1]

1. Mr. Forde is in Washington but the matter of your telegram had
already been fully discussed between us and I think you will agree
that our tactics are sound. There is a large body of nations
against the Veto on peaceful settlement or conciliation. From the
first we have taken a leading part in this question. During the
talks in England it was clearly understood what our attitude was
and indeed all the Dominion Governments objected to this form of
the Veto which is not possible to justify in principle.

2. Our course has been pursued consistently. First it is
impossible to carry an amendment against the present Dumbarton
Oaks voting formula unless there is a two thirds majority for the
amendment. Indeed it is quite probable that there will be a large
number of abstentions and that the final vote for Australia's
amendment will not be considerable. This does not mean that the
conference is against our view but only means that under great
pressure most countries will yield and hope for improvement in the
future. Unfortunately the difficulty about improvement in the
future is that there is also a veto about amendments to the
constitution and we are also endeavouring to obtain an amendment
on that point.

3. The line we have taken is indicated in the statement issued by
us yesterday. [2] It disputes the legal interpretation of the four
sponsoring powers and allows scope for future argument and
modification after the charter is ratified.

4. Therefore we shall have to carry our amendment to the vote but
it will be defeated owing to the facts I have stated and then the
Dumbarton Oaks text will be adopted. By this means we take our
protest up to the last logical point. Anything short of that would
be quite unsatisfactory. On the other hand the charter will not be
imperilled.

5. In the circumstances your message as to our substantial
progress and the weight of advantages obtained for Australia in
respect of the general assembly and the economic and social
council is most welcome. I understand your anxiety is to avoid
deadlock. We share it and the deadlock will be avoided.

6. Another important aspect of the matter is that if we had
surrendered the position on Thursday last we would have been
placed in great difficulty on other outstanding matters. As it is
I made it abundantly clear on Saturday that we desired to preserve
the charter to which we have contributed much but that it is our
duty to the last to warn the organisation not only against an
unsatisfactory legal interpretation but also against the glaring
defect which enables one nation to block the Security Council
performing its most important function of conciliating disputants
at a sufficiently early stage of their dispute to avoid all
reasonable chance of force being used.

7. If there is any further development I shall let you know
immediately but we understand your desire to preserve the charter
and this is exactly the policy which will be followed by us to the
end.

1 Document 107.

2 Published as Annex O to the Report by the Australian Delegates
to the United Nations Conference on International Organization,
San Francisco, 25 April - 26 June 1945, Commonwealth Parliamentary
Papers, 1945-46, vol. III.


[AA : A1066, H45/771/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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