SFC37.

Further our SFC33 [1] regarding voting procedure in Security
Council.

Halifax called a British Commonwealth meeting on Sunday evening
3rd June at which in addition to ourselves there were present
Cranborne, Smuts, Fraser and the Canadian and Indian
representatives. He said that on the evening of 1st June the
Soviet Ambassador presented to meeting of representatives of
sponsoring Powers and France a statement of Soviet views based
upon a reply from Moscow as to the correct interpretation of the
Yalta formula. This statement made it clear that the Soviet held
that in decisions under Chapter VIII Section A the veto applied to
discussion and consideration of a dispute by the Security Council
save that under paragraph 3 of Section C of Chapter VI a party to
a dispute was precluded from voting.

This would mean that in spite of views expressed in Commission III
Committee 1 by Cadogan, the veto would apply to all matters
enumerated in Section A of Chapter VIII. In other words, the
interpretation of the Yalta formula advanced by the Soviet Union
coincided exactly with the interpretation which Evatt had claimed
was the strict meaning of the Yalta formula.

Halifax said that representatives of the United States, the United
Kingdom, China and France made clear their reactions at a meeting
with the Soviet representative on 2nd June. Stettinius indicated
that the United States could not sign a Charter founded on this
interpretation. Connally [2] said that it was improbable that the
United States Senate would agree to such a Charter and Vandenberg
[3] added that it would definitely not get through the Senate.

Halifax then told Gromyko that the Soviet proposal was entirely
unacceptable to the United Kingdom which attached the greatest
importance to free discussion and consideration. Wellington Koo
said that on the whole China favoured the Anglo-American rather
than the Russian thesis and Paul Boncour [4] added that although
he had not been able to study a French translation of the Russian
text he nevertheless inclined to the Anglo-American thesis.

Halifax then told us that he had cabled London stating that a
crisis had arisen and that a head-on clash with the Russians had
now developed. As the Soviet had had a fortnight to consider their
answer it seemed unlikely that they would yield to further
arguments. If their attitude was to be modified at all an appeal
to Stalin would be necessary and perhaps a joint message or
identical messages from President Truman and Mr. Churchill might
be considered. If this was regarded as undesirable or failed the
only remaining hope would be for the question to be discussed at a
meeting of the Heads of Governments. In that event perhaps France
and China should be present for discussion of this item.

Halifax added that in his message to London he had said that three
possible courses were open at the San Francisco Conference-
(a) to take the line that the present divergence was so great that
unless it could be overcome there was no point in going on with
the Conference;

(b) to propose an amendment to the text of Chapter VIII Section A
making it clear that the veto did not apply to discussion and
consideration of disputes by the Council. This amendment would be
carried in Committee but the effect might be that Russia would
refuse to sign the Charter even if she did not withdraw from the
Conference before that point;

(c) to let the Conference know the present position and take the
line that the remaining outstanding questions should now be
settled and the Charter provisionally approved or even perhaps
signed with the express reservation that it would not come into
force until the major question of interpretation of the Yalta
formula had been settled to their satisfaction.

Course (a) might mean no organisation, Course (b) an organisation
without Russia, and Course (c) an organisation which might or
might not be still-born depending upon the five permanent members
of the Council reaching agreement regarding the application of the
veto. On the whole he had recommended to London adoption of Course
(c) although he had given a warning that it was not certain that
either the remaining permanent members of the Council or the
Conference at large would agree to this course.

During the discussion which ensued at our meeting, it was
generally agreed that if it proved impossible to obtain
modification of the Soviet view every effort should be made to
make quite clear to the Conference and to world opinion the issues
involved and the different views of the Soviet Union on the one
hand and the remaining members of the Big Five [and] of the
Conference as a whole on the other hand. At the same time every
effort should also be taken to avoid any Conference action which
might result in Russia's withdrawal from the Conference or refusal
to sign or ratify the Charter. Thus instead of insisting on an
immediate vote in Committee it might be possible to secure an
agreed reply by the Great Powers to the questionnaire on the veto
which had been submitted to them. This reply would set out clearly
the different interpretations given to the Yalta formula and the
matter could then be brought before the Steering Committee or
perhaps the Executive Committee for further action instead of
being dealt with by Committee 1 of Commission III. No precise
procedure was agreed to but Halifax will sound out the United
States along these lines to get their reactions and he will report
to us again.

While we will all do everything possible to avoid any open breach
with the Soviet Union it is evident that a Charter under which any
Great Power not a party to a dispute can prevent bare
consideration of it by the Security Council under Chapter VIII A
in order to discuss the facts with a view to considering means of
Pacific settlement would be almost meaningless. Under the League
of Nations practice no country was able to prevent a matter being
heard and discussed by the Council and any Charter which failed to
go as far as this would hardly secure the requisite number of
ratifications by members of the United Nations to enable the world
organisation to be established.

Another aspect of the matter is that the United Kingdom Government
has got itself into some difficulty without adequate prior
consultation with the Dominions. At London we were informed by
Eden and his legal advisers that the Yalta formula should not
preclude mere consideration of a dispute by the Security Council.

Yet in spite of the personal interpretation given in Committee by
Cadogan on 17th May the attitude of the United Kingdom at this
Conference has remained most uncertain and the Dominions have not
yet seen any document setting out official interpretation given to
the Yalta formula by the United Kingdom Government and
communicated to the other great powers. The United Kingdom did not
consult any Dominion before official interpretations of United
Kingdom and other great powers were transmitted by the Soviet
representative to his Government from San Francisco. Indeed no
such consultation on this subject has taken place since. A clearer
and more definite stand by the United Kingdom at an earlier stage
along the lines taken after receipt of reply from Moscow might
have had good effect upon the Soviet attitude. As it is, the
situation is very delicate and difficult, but we will assist in
finding a solution without either appeasement of the Soviet or
playing into the hands of anti-Soviet propaganda.