73 Bruce to Curtin
Cablegram 38[A] LONDON, 9 March 1944, 7.20 p.m.
IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET
For the Prime Minister.
In my telegram 31[A] of 29th [February]  my intention was to
make it clear that Dulanty's  visit to me was an official one
for the purpose of giving me an official message from his Prime
Minister  for transmission to you. Dulanty and I were merely
the convenient medium of connection owing to there being no
representation either in Dublin or Canberra of the respective
Governments. I am afraid, in view of Evatt's telegram 32 of 9th
March , I cannot have made it clear that this was the position.
In any event Dulanty has been on the telephone to me this
afternoon and it will be necessary for me to give him an official
The alternative replies are that I should inform Dulanty that I
have communicated with my Government and have been instructed to
inform him either that-
(1) My Government does not see its way to acquiesce in Mr. de
Valera's request that the Australian Government should intervene
with a view to having the American note  withdrawn, or
(2) That the Australian Government is in accord with the American
request for the removal of the German and Japanese representatives
and hopes that the Eire Government will see its way to agree to
In the case of (1) the reply could, I think, be conveyed orally.
in the case of (2) it would be necessary, in my view, to send
Dulanty a written communication which I suggest would have to be
very carefully drafted down similar lines to the Canadian reply.
In considering which of these two courses should be adopted, the
fact which I have now ascertained has to be borne in mind that
both the United Kingdom and the United States of America
Governments are aware of the approach to Australia and are
awaiting with considerable interest what reply is returned.
Not unnaturally the hope of both is that the Australian reply will
be down similar lines to that of the Canadian Government thus
presenting a solid front on this issue.