Cablegrams 138 and 139 [1] CANBERRA, 19 September 1944
PERSONAL ONLY SECRET
I am naturally concerned with the difference of opinion in
relation to the right of veto exercisable by a permanent member of
the Council in relation to a dispute to which that member is a
party. At the same time it seems tragic that the negotiations
should break down merely on that point and especially at the
present moment.
In the first place, there is something to be said for the view
that unless the three Great Powers have the will to resolve
peacefully actual or threatened disputes to which one or more of
them is a party, world peace will be most seriously and grievously
threatened. The Soviet view seems to be that, if there is a
serious dispute in which two of the three Great Powers are
irrevocably at odds with the third, the machinery of the World
Organisation should not be employed to discipline that big power
which may be adjudged in default. Much may be gained by
reconsidering this matter and not rejecting Russia's view out of
hand. One possible solution is to adopt the Russian thesis
provisionally but at the same time provide constitutional
machinery for reviewing that decision in say, two years' time when
the permanent Council will have to be reconstituted. In any event,
it might be wiser to permit the United Nations, as a whole, to
discuss the pros and cons of this matter rather than treat the
negotiations as at an end during this most critical period.
In a recent analysis before the House [2], I made the following
observations which seem to me to be applicable in principle:
The overwhelming preponderance of the world's armed strength now
lies in the hands of three powers-Great Britain, the United States
and the Soviet Union. The military power of each one of these
powers is so great that any security system which did not have the
full backing of all three would have little chance of success.
Equally, it is doubtful whether, if any one of these three were
minded to commit an act of aggression, it could be checked by
anything less than another world conflict, which it is the primary
purpose of any security organisation to avoid.
It follows, firstly, that it is basic to the success of any world
Organisation that each of the three Great Powers must be ready to
renounce war as an instrument of national policy and a means must
be found for composing amicably any differences amongst the Big
Three and, secondly, that the three Great Powers must act unitedly
against aggression or threats to peace on the part of any other
nation. While this may sound like what is called 'power politics',
it is only bare common sense, having regard to the experience
gained in the working of the League of Nations.
(To London only-This is a personal view, but I would like you to
discuss it with Eden. Best wishes.)
(To Washington only-This is a personal view, but I would like you
to put it to Cadogan or Halifax or both and also talk it over with
Berendsen.)
[AA:A5954, BOX 1821]