For Mr. Curtin from Dr. Evatt.

I think that in giving general endorsement to outline of United
Kingdom Foreign Policy as expressed in your telegram No. 12 [1],
care should be taken to see that certain points on which
Australian Government has insisted are also properly recognised
and safeguarded. It would be dangerous to allow the assumption
that because Churchill's statement of British motives and ideals
in Foreign Policy is in itself unexceptionable, we are satisfied
with actual conduct of that policy, or are content simply to
subscribe to what United Kingdom does in the name of those ideals.

2. It is to be feared that Churchill's statement, and his
expressed appreciation of the support by the Dominion Prime
Ministers, carries the implication that the affairs of the United
Nations can very well be run on a three-power or four-power basis.

We have always strongly contested this. I believe our point of
view should be firmly advanced that, as an accepted rule:-

(i) Dominions should be associated from the beginning with
arrangements affecting the post-war international order, with
opportunity for expression of views at every stage.

(ii) Where Dominions are not separate parties to an arrangement or
declaration of this kind, what is done should (after full
consultation between London and the Dominions) be in the name of
the British Commonwealth and not the United Kingdom alone.

(iii) Where the primary regional responsibility is with a Dominion
and not with the United Kingdom, the Dominion concerned should be
as fully assured of proper support from the United Kingdom as the
United Kingdom is of Dominion support in its own relations in
Europe and special spheres such as the Near and Middle East.

3. As for (i) and (ii) above, you will remember the outstanding
cases about which Australia has had reason to protest against its
exclusion or attempted exclusion from three or four-power
decisions on matters of the closest concern to ourselves. The
declaration on Austria was a notorious case [2]: well known to
Bruce. Others have been the Cairo Conference [3], the interim
arrangements arising out of the Italian Armistice [4], the
preliminary United Kingdom - United States - Soviet exchanges on
security [5], and the handling of the exchanges on civil aviation.

[6] In particular, the Moscow declaration of October last [7],
which contains some of the very principles enunciated to you by
Churchill, showed beyond doubt the readiness of the United
Kingdom, unless checked, to accept a four-power disposition of
affairs of over-riding concern to all the United Nations. The
Australian Government's attempt to secure a proper place in the
declaration for the voice and interests of the smaller powers, or
for the association with the statement of the British Commonwealth
as a whole, was a wholesome check, but the trend we then tried to
resist is still apparent.

4. In respect also of post-war aviation, I am concerned at reports
reaching here to-day of Beaverbrook's statement in the House of
Lords. [8] It shows that the United Kingdom Government has gravely
misunderstood or mis-stated the position of Australia and New
Zealand. It is a serious matter if, in the bilateral talks that
have been going on between London and Washington, the Americans
have been given to understand that the Australian Government has
endorsed the conclusions reached at the entirely non-committal and
informal conversations held in London last October and that the
Australian and New Zealand Governments would be prepared to make
concessions in regard to the vital principles enumerated in the
Canberra Agreement. [9] The position now reached fully justifies
the doubts we expressed as to the wisdom of joint United Kingdom -
United States talks on this matter in advance of a real agreement
on principles within the British Commonwealth. [10]

5. As regards (iii) of paragraph 2 above, I hope you will press
the British authorities for a definite assurance that they will
give willing and active support to the Pacific Conference
envisaged by the Australian and New Zealand Governments in the
Canberra Agreement, and will, if necessary, commend it to the
United States. The conference will be a beginning with the actual
application in this region of the principles expressed by
Churchill with his mind mainly on Europe.

6. In the background of both Eden's and Churchill's statements,
and our own approach to these matters, is the question of what can
practically be done to improve the correlation of foreign policy
within the British Commonwealth, given that the major points on
which we insist receive recognition. I am not yet aware of what
actual proposals, if any, in this respect, are now under
discussion in London, and would much appreciate information from
you especially in light of vague and conflicting reports about the
so-called Imperial Secretariat. Best wishes.