50 Bruce to Curtin
Cablegram 154[A] LONDON, 18 September 1942, 12.15 a.m.
PERSONAL MOST SECRET
Your telegrams 407 and 408 , and two messages to the President.
 I have learned tonight unofficially that the President
probably replied to you today.  If my information is correct as
to its contents it is a draft of the Combined Chiefs of Staff very
little altered by the President.
The views of the Combined Chiefs of Staff are in line with those
of the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff here, in which I
have been unable to effect any alteration notwithstanding that I
have brought out and amplified all the arguments and points in
As a background to the President's cable I send you the following
broad picture of my experience here.
My argument has been that owing to the strength of the Japanese
naval forces in the Pacific there is a possibility that a severe
reverse might be inflicted upon our naval forces in that arena;
that having superior total naval forces to the Japanese it is
folly to risk such a reverse particularly having regard to the
disastrous consequences that might follow, e.g. a large scale
invasion of Australia which at the worst might result in the loss
of our only air base in the Pacific from which a counter-attack
against Japan can be staged, and at the best in the diversion of
United Kingdom reinforcements for India and the Middle East to
Australia, in accordance with Churchill's pledge, thereby greatly
endangering our position in these theatres.
The answer to this contention has been
(1) that owing to the strength of the United [States]  naval
forces in the Pacific the danger of the Japanese inflicting a
substantial reverse is only a remote one and
(2) that an attempt by Japan to stage a full-scale invasion of
Australia is unlikely as Japan has not the necessary shipping
available for transport of the required forces.
With regard to (1) I have argued as strongly as I can that this is
too optimistic a view and further that the consequences in the
event of it proving wrong are so serious that no avoidable risk
should be taken.
With regard to (2) the argument is based upon the estimate that
the maximum force the available Japanese shipping could transport
would be eight to ten divisions and that Australia would have an
equal number of divisions available and would be able to meet any
attempt on this scale.
In reply to this I have argued that Japan having the choice of
where to attack would feel that a force of this size would be
sufficient having regard to the wide dispersal of our forces and
our inability to bring about a sufficient concentration in time.
The arguments on both (1) and (2) have gone backwards and forwards
down lines which I need not transmit to you.
Broadly the attitude here is that the United States naval forces
are adequate and that any risk involved is a legitimate and
reasonable one to take. Based upon this view the decision was
arrived at not to reinforce the naval forces in the Pacific and
this decision was conveyed to you in Dominions Office telegram
This decision I told you in my telegram 150 I saw little prospect
of altering  and I gather that it has been adopted by the
President in his reply.
I have strenuously argued [the case] for an increase in our air
allocation and urged greater support by the United Kingdom
representatives in Washington. I have particularly stressed the
necessity for greater air strength in view of the decision not to
reinforce the naval strength in the Pacific. I have been unable to
alter the attitude expressed in the Prime Minister's cable
(Dominions Office telegram 588 ) and I understand that the
President has adopted a similar attitude.
With regard to the reinforcement of Australia by three further
United States divisions, the attitude is that the tonnage required
to transport these divisions would be approximately one million
tons, that this tonnage clearly could not be provided as a whole
and that the divisions could only be got to Australia piecemeal
over an extended period.
This being so it is argued that if the naval disaster we visualise
eventuated the divisions would not get to Australia in time, if at
all. From this it is contended that the allocation of these three
divisions plus the necessary shipping would be an unwise diversion
of our resources at a time when they are vitally required
While every aspect of our case in respect to sea, land and air has
been argued in detail the basic strategic policy laid down in
W.W.1  has been the governing principle behind the arguments
which have been advanced here.
That principle we might have fought successfully when it was
arrived at last December if we had known of it at the time. Now it
is almost hopeless to get it reversed. Applying that principle it
is contended that the diversions we asked for would interfere with
the operational plans that are now being undertaken to give effect
to the basic strategy of W.W.1 and such diversions would only be
justified if they were necessary for the defence of Australia. It
is contended that there is no such necessity and I gather that the
President has taken this line in his reply to you.
I regret that my efforts have been of so little avail but the
difficulty of achieving anything has been considerably increased
by the fact that it is consistently contended here that everything
possible is being done to help us in Washington but that the final
decision as to what is necessary for Australia must be decided by
the American Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
[DEFENCE:SPECIAL COLLECTION II, BUNDLE 5, STRATEGICAL POLICY-SWPA,
FILE No. 3, 48/1942]