216 Evatt to Hodgson
Cablegram E146 WASHINGTON, 7 June 1943, 4.02 p.m.
MOST SECRET PERSONAL
1. Eggleston's wire No.21  synchronises similar Chinese
argument presented here at highest level. There is no occasion for
further action by us because he can take it that reasonable
reinforcement of United States air force has been decided upon.
Churchill views with suspicion Chinese propaganda to accelerate or
dictate the nature of Burma attack which cannot commence until the
end of monsoons and details of which are, in any case, a military
2. Eggleston can be told that Australia has invariably given
general support to China for it is an integral part of the war
against Japan. But I have grave suspicions of the nature of
communiques and sometimes think that Eggleston should always take
this into account.
3. Specifically I would like his views on the following-
(a) Was the recent Japanese attack an all out offensive on
(b) Were Chinese communiques accurate or not-if not, for what
purpose was position played up.
(c) Having regard to the universal assumption that the Japanese
could seize Chungking at any time, is there any reason to suspect
link up or understanding between Chungking and Japan as to the
extent of operations.
(d) Have not Japanese forces in China been decreased by many
divisions in the last six months.
As to (d) please tell me latest from Australian Intelligence
4. In any event, there is no need for Eggleston to send these
messages to London.