I have had the honour to report in my despatch No. 5 [1] that
(accompanied by Mr. Crawford) I left Kuibyshev on the morning of
February 8th for Moscow in order to see MR. MOLOTOV [2] and put
before him the desire of the Australian government to send a
Military Mission to the U.S. S. R. The journey was a very slow one
owing to serious congestion on the railways, due to the pressure
of military trains, and I did not arrive in Moscow until the
afternoon of the 12th. Mr. Molotov was very busy and was unable to
receive me until the 16th. The interview, to which I was
accompanied by Prof. Crawford, lasted 35 minutes and was of a
friendly and frank character.

2. I said that my Government had welcomed the exchange of
diplomatic representatives and that it would welcome the
opportunity of supplementing its diplomatic mission by sending a
Military Mission to the Soviet Union. From that mission it felt
further co-operation between the two countries would result. In
the course of the oral representations which I made to Mr.

Molotov, I said that my Government was impressed, as was the
entire world, with the achievements of the Red Army and its
leaders and that we were actively interested in the possibility of
an Australian Military Mission visiting the Soviet Union. I asked
also whether, if such a visit were arranged, the following
facilities would be made available to it:

(a) To visit various parts of the active fronts.

(b) To confer with Soviet Staff Officers and discuss general
matters of Soviet strategy and tactics.

(c) To visit training camps and depots.

(d) To inspect air force depots and units.

3. Continuing my representations to Mr. Molotov I said that my
Country was almost completely on a total war footing and I quoted
the figures given by our Prime Minister in his broadcast speech of
the 24th January 1943. I alluded also to the part we had already
taken in the global war by the participation by Australian troops
in the first Libyan battle, and in the battles in Greece, Crete
and Syria. I also said that Australians had been unconquered in
Tobruk for eight months and had taken part in the recent great
successes of the British Eighth Army in Libya. Our armies were at
the moment fighting to keep the invaders from reaching Australian
shores.

4. Once or twice Mr. Molotov interrupted me by asking whether it
was not a fact that the Australian troops in their engagements in
the Middle East and our fliers at Murmansk were under the direct
command of the British Army. I said that this was so but that they
were led as separate fighting organisations under the exclusive
leadership of Australian officers. These interjections seemed to
indicate that he felt that the British Military Mission at present
in Moscow could represent the Australian military forces.

5. From the interpreter, (Mr. Molotov speaking in Russian) I
gathered his reply to be that as the Australian Army in the Middle
East was under the control of the British Army it formed part of
that army and was indirectly represented by the British Military
Mission at present, and since the outbreak of war, situated in
Moscow. I interrupted at this stage and said that although it was
correct that our troops in the Middle East formed part of the
British Army and command, they were under the direct command of
their own officers and that in the early Middle East campaign the
Australian Commander-in-Chief, General Blamey, was made deputy
commander of the entire British forces.

6. Mr. Molotov then referred to the considerable number of members
of the British Military Mission, but I interrupted again, saying
that although I had no express information on the matter I would
assume that our mission would be a very small one consisting of
probably three members and would very likely consist of serving
officers in the ranks of the Australian Army at present in the
Middle East. I added that I also assumed that the mission would be
a visiting and not a standing one.

7. Mr. Molotov then went on to say that the whole of the time and
energies of the Soviet Officers and staff were directed to the
driving of the invaders from Soviet soil and that the Government
had deliberately refrained from taking visiting parties to the
fronts. He added that in the recent case of General Hurley (to
whose visit I had already referred in the interview) he came as a
special envoy of the President of the U.S.A. and for that reason
had been afforded wider facilities. Mr. Molotov added that he
thought that the engagements of the Australian forces had been
chiefly naval and that consequently there was not such a great
need for the mission but I immediately corrected this impression
by stating that although our navy had been actively engaged in
various theatres in which it had suffered great losses, it was our
land and air forces which had been engaged far more numerically,
and I referred again to the engagements in which they had taken
part.

8. Finally Mr. Molotov said that he would discuss this matter with
his military advisers and then communicate his decision to me
later on. I have reported accordingly in my telegram No. 26. [3]

9. As a matter of comment, it is interesting to note that no
reference was made by either of us to the Pacific situation. I had
purposely been careful to avoid discussion along these lines and
Mr. Molotov did not refer to it either expressly or by
implication.

10. I repeat that the discussion was marked by its frankness and
fairness throughout, but I am inclined to think that at first Mr.

Molotov's attitude was one of opposition to our request, he taking
the view that as there was a British Military Mission already in
Russia, and that as we formed part of British military forces, the
British Military Mission should be sufficient to represent
Australia in the Soviet Union. But, towards the end of the
interview, and after the exchange of questions and replies, he
appeared to be considerably more favourable to our point of view
and finally agreed to discuss the matter with his military
advisers. [4]

W. SLATER