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108 Bruce to Curtin

Cablegram 15[A] LONDON, 21 January 1943, 8.15 p.m.


[Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca between 14 and 24
January to plan global strategy for 1943 and 1944. They decided
that the Mediterranean should continue to be the main theatre of
operations in Europe and reaffirmed that Germany should be
defeated before a full-scale offensive was launched against the

In view of the meeting now in progress you might well expect that
the United Kingdom Government would advise you as to the broad
issues to be considered or that I would be in a position to convey
something officially to you.

While I am in my following telegram sending you some information
this is only a personal appreciation. [1]

It is desirable that I should make clear to you how this comes
about and in order to do so it is necessary to give you an
impression of the Prime Minister's methods with which I imagine
you are not altogether unfamiliar.

The Prime Minister went off on his present adventure without any
prior discussion with the War Cabinet as to the broad lines of
policy he was to follow in the discussion now taking place.

This must appear astounding to you and was even somewhat startling
to me, familiar as I am with the Prime Minister's methods and the
way he treats the War Cabinet.

Having some uncertainty as to whether the War Cabinet might not
have been consulted without my being present, I tackled Attlee who
so convinced me that nothing of the sort had happened as to lead
me to make the observation to him 'that Hitler has nothing on your
Prime Minister as a dictator'. [2]

The above might well create in your mind the gravest apprehensions
as to the position here. Actually it is not as alarming as it
sounds. The Prime Minister stands so far above his colleagues that
it is inevitable he should dominate them and that being so it is
probably as well that he should get on with the job in his own way
as with his temperament and at his age he would be quite
ineffective if he attempted to alter his methods. In practice his
mind is almost entirely absorbed with the strategy and actual
fighting of the war. Here he has a tremendous drive and a great
imagination which at times leads him to wild conceptions from
which he is saved by the efficient machine he has behind him in
the Chiefs of Staff organisation, particularly the Joint Planners
who produce admirably the hard facts and figures which show the
impracticability of his ideas when he goes off the rails.

In regard to questions other than those concerned with the actual
strategy and fighting of the war the Prime Minister shows little
interest. My experience has convinced me that they are being
efficiently handled and that they are the subject of much clear
thinking. This, however, is being done in the majority of cases at
a level below the Ministerial.

When, however, important action has to be taken it is nearly
always necessary to arouse the Prime Minister's interest. This is
difficult to do but if it can be done his driving force and power
of putting things over with his colleagues, with Parliament and
with the people ensures results.

The above I need hardly stress is for your personal information
and merely to give you something of the atmosphere here.


1 See cablegram 16A of 21 January on file AA:M100, January 1943.

Bruce reported that Stalin was pressing Churchill to launch a
direct frontal attack on Europe, although the Chiefs of Staff
favoured a continued concentration on the Mediterranean campaign.

Bruce also told Curtin that: 'Although we have done everything we
could here to bring home the necessity for a review of the
position in the Pacific and have in particular stressed your man
power problem my own view is that the Prime Minister is so
obsessed with his difficulties in Europe that any initiative in
regard to the Pacific area will have to come from the President.'
2 See Document 100.

Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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