Reference your cablegrams M.337, M.338 [2] and M.342. [3]

1. While Japan's Policy will probably be determined more by the
result of the German-Russian struggle than anything else, it would
appear that great significance is to be attached to the proposed
return to London of Mr. Shigemitsu [4] in view of the moderate
elements he represents and their influence on the constitution of
the new Government, vide your cablegram M.330. [5]

2. Having constantly before us the desirability of keeping Japan
out of the war and reaching a general settlement with her, it is
important that any measures to safeguard our defensive position in
the war against the Axis Powers by deterring Japan from acts of
aggression, which threaten our vital interests or Russia, should
not close the door to an understanding while the possibility
exists and so long as we do not sacrifice any vital interests
during the course of any discussions. Accordingly it is our view
that any warning issued to Japan on the lines contemplated should
reiterate our willingness and desire to seek a general settlement
in the Pacific which respects the rights of all parties.

3. We consider that the warning should then proceed to state that
any attack by Japan on Russia will be resisted by force by the
British Commonwealth irrespective of the attitude of the United
States of America.

4. While the Commonwealth Government does not think that the
notification should be conditional upon any reciprocal undertaking
by United States, Netherlands or China, it considers every
endeavour should be made to obtain the maximum collaboration of
these countries in the event of a Japanese attack on Soviet
Russia.

5. While the notification to Japan should not be conditional upon
such assurance, a reciprocal guarantee should be sought from
Russia that if Japan attacks in a southward direction Russia will
declare war on Japan.

6. The foregoing view was unanimously endorsed by the Advisory War
Council, which includes representatives of all Parties. [6]

CURTIN