I saw Admiral Turner, Director of [War Plans] I United States
Navy, October 14th. On my asking for his views on the possibility
of Japanese undertaking southward offensive he said he thought it
would take the Japanese considerable time to make the necessary
large scale preparations. Their belief was that there were only
about 40,000 Japanese in Indo-China and that work on Camranh Bay
and on air fields in Indo-China was long way from completion.

Recent Japanese trend was towards the reinforcing of their forces
in Manchuria even at the expense of their forces in China, and not
towards the south.

On the other hand Japanese had a chain of stepping stones (with
air fields) in islands southward from Tokyo and were working hard
on Saipan 50 miles north of Guam. There was also Japanese air
strength at Palau island.

On my telling him of the President's [2] tentative suggestion that
R.A.A.F. might consider operating from North Borneo [3] he
suggested that R.A.A.F. might even consider the possibility of
using air fields in the Philippines although he admitted that this
was a matter for U.S. Army.

In senior American service quarters here there is fear that Japan
may attack Russia shortly. General belief is that the United
States would maintain neutrality in such an event so long as
American and British interests were not also attacked.

[matter omitted]