It seems to me that the following points now arise from paragraphs
1 and 2 of General Ismay's letter detailing the arrangements made
in London between Mr. Churchill and the War Cabinet and myself as
representing His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of
Australia. [1]

1. Paragraph 1 of the letter declares the firm intention of His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to protect Australia's
safety to the maximum extent and you as the senior British
representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee are instructed to
press the United States Chiefs of Staff for assurances that
measures would be taken to ensure that safety.

2. It seems essential that these general instructions should be
taken into particular account in relation to the air allocations
at present under review.

3. In the opinion of General MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief of
the South West Pacific Area, the existing allocation in respect of
aircraft is inadequate. This opinion is not decisive but it is at
least highly significant. Very little naval strength is under
General MacArthur's command so that the position turns largely
upon air, as you yourself pointed out to Sir Owen Dixon [2] and
myself when we paid our call upon you recently. Before the
recommendations of the Supreme Commander are rejected, or even
modified, it would seem desirable that you should be affirmatively
and independently satisfied that the forces proposed for the area
will enable the Commander to carry out his assigned mission.

4. All the existing arrangements in relation to the grand strategy
made between the Governments of Britain and the United States
postulate that the security of Australia and New Zealand shall be
maintained and adequate forces allocated to such tasks. The
ultimate defeat of Japan depends on the retention of areas from
which forces can be brought to bear against the enemy.

5. General MacArthur's directive was apparently drafted in
accordance with this grand strategy. The strategy defined in the
directive requires that the South West Pacific Area shall be
secured and that, in addition, preparation is to be made for the
ultimate offensive against Japan.

6. His Majesty's Government in Australia has not been consulted as
to the grand strategy. Moreover, a case can be made, in our
opinion, to show that in the changed position of the Pacific,
there should be a revision of such strategy so that the defeat of
Japan shall be regarded as a primary and not as a secondary
objective of the United Nations, particularly as the new economic
empire now controlled by Japan enables her to blockade the United
Nations rather than the reverse.

7. However, at present, we are bound to accept the grand strategy.

But this strategy itself imposes an obligation to provide the
South West Pacific Commander with sufficient forces at least to
carry out the defence of that area.

8. For instance, General Ismay's letter, expressing the views of
Mr. Churchill and the War Cabinet, states that General Marshall's
[3] plan for an offensive in Europe was accepted on the
undertaking that adequate forces must be allocated to safeguard
the defence of Australia and the island bases connecting that
country with the United States.

9. The relevant question, therefore, is-are sufficient forces,
land, sea and air, being provided to carry out this undertaking?
It is clear from General MacArthur's demands that, in the opinion
of those on the spot, sufficient forces are not yet being
provided.

10. One crucial aspect of the matter is this. Mr. Churchill and
the War Cabinet have explicitly reaffirmed their undertaking that,
in the event of a large scale invasion of Australia by Japan,
Britain would cut its losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to
the aid of Australia, sacrificing every interest except only the
defence and feeding of the United Kingdom itself. This obligation
must be taken into account now, for it is of vital concern to the
common cause that the occasion for putting into effect the
obligation should never be permitted to arise.

11. Diversion of great forces to Australia from the Middle East
and India would alter the entire strategy of the world war, yet
Britain is obliged to do all this in the event of large scale
invasion of Australia.

12. Therefore, it is essential that forces sufficient to prevent
full scale invasion should be made available now when the forces
and equipment involved are only a fraction of what would have to
be provided later in the contingency contemplated by Mr. Churchill
and the War Cabinet.

13. Moreover, it must be apparent that, with a concentration of
forces against Germany in Western Europe, Japan will assist her
ally by striking hard in the Pacific theatres of war.

14. For the above reasons and having regard to the War Cabinet
instructions that you should co-operate with the United States
Chiefs of Staff for assurances that measures will be taken to
ensure the safety of Australia-I request that, in the proposed
agreement as to allocation of forces, including air equipment,
allocations to the South West Pacific and New Zealand should be
specially safeguarded. For the reasons I have given, Australia and
New Zealand are placed in an entirely different position from the
Middle East and India, which would both have to be sacrificed to
repel full scale invasion of Australia.

15. I understand that a new agreement between Britain and the
United States in relation to aircraft allocations is approaching
finality, and I suggest that express and detailed provisions
should be included in the agreement specifying such allocations as
will obviate the necessity of subsequent diversions of great
forces to Australia and New Zealand. Broadly speaking, allocations
which are necessary to secure vital Pacific bases against Japan
should be charged against the pool of combined resources before
they are devoted to the carrying out of large scale offensive
projects against Germany. Having regard to the comparatively small
demands for the Pacific, these latter projects will not be
seriously prejudiced if the suggestion is adopted.

16. In order to consider the subject of this memorandum, would you
be good enough to arrange that you and Air Marshal Slessor [4]
should confer with Sir Owen Dixon and myself
17. The relevant portion of General Ismay's letter is as follows:-

[Evatt here reproduced the letter, up to the end of paragraph
(2).]

18. I would be glad if you would regard this matter as
particularly urgent as my time in Washington is drawing to a
close.

H. V. EVATT