For Hodgson for Prime Minister [1] from Evatt. [2]

Your S.L. 21. [3] Exchange of officials with Japan.

(1) Following is summary of United Kingdom reply to my
representations to Attlee [4] and Eden [5] on behalf of Bowden and
staff and Ross (my telegram ET.16 [6]). Begins:

When negotiations were initiated possibility of insisting on the
inclusion of Malaya, Hong Kong and North Borneo carefully
considered and conclusion reluctantly reached that attempt to do
so would inevitably be refused by Japan and probably wreck the
scheme. (This was presumably before we were consulted, see D.O.

Tel.No. 386, April 28th. [7]) This meant abandonment by United
Kingdom Government of all prospect of repatriation of over 3,000
British officials and by Netherlands Government of release of
their nationals in N.E.I.

At that stage Portuguese Timor was still nominally under the
control of the Portuguese and the U.K. Government did not ask for
its inclusion.

Course of negotiation has now reached a possibly critical stage.

Japan have the whiphand over the British Empire in view of the
great disparity in numbers, and little doubt that they are
prepared to use it.

Bowden. Assuming his evacuation were possible this would make him
a solitary exception to all British subjects in Malaya. United
States have also been unable to secure repatriation of any of
their nationals in Malaya. Furthermore Bowden's present
whereabouts unknown.

Ross. According to latest advice from Portuguese Government
(Dominions Office telegram No. 268 May 25th [8]) guerilla fighting
still proceeding in hills. Japanese therefore have no effective
control of Portuguese Timor and would probably be unable, even if
willing, to effect Ross's removal.

Special nature of the two cases, in view of Australian
Government's undertaking and of number of Japanese in Australia,
is fully appreciated. Only 52 of these Japanese however were
originally in Australia.

In the light of the above felt that no attempt should be made to
follow up case of Bowden but that, in a last minute hope,
communication might be addressed to Japan re Ross. While request
should be put to Japan as forcibly as possible it should be agreed
in advance that, if Japan refuses, Commonwealth Government should
be prepared to withdraw conditions attached by them to exchange
and agree to it proceeding on basis at present arranged. Summary
ends.

(2) I strongly dissent from above and adhere to view expressed in
my telegram E.T.9. [9] I think arguments are trifling and
specious. I am opposed to returning to Japan the Japanese
internees and think we would be blamed by public for taking so
great a risk to our security. Australia has whiphand over Japan,
and we should be prepared to use it in order to keep faith with
Bowden and Ross.

I suggest matter might be allowed to wait until I can consult you
and explain personally my impressions gained here of the problem.