FROM SMITH TO DR EVATT ONLY

Your telegram No-44. [1]

Had long discussion with Hopkins [2] this evening and now furnish
the following comments:

Your paragraph 2-extreme difficulty here in obtaining true picture
of aircraft position but American policy of placing American
personnel in American aircraft, if followed to its logical
conclusion and on the well-founded assumption that there will not
be enough aircraft for all purposes, could mean that ultimately
there could be no aircraft for the R.A.A.F. as such unless
supplies are forthcoming from the United Kingdom. It could also
mean that aircraft could be retained in this country for training
purposes, whilst trained personnel in Australia, where the battle
is raging, would be without machines. Hopkins agreed that this is
so but states that in practice such a position would not develop
and in any case the new American policy is based on definite
promises that no less number of American aircraft will be in any
theatre owing to the implementation of the policy, if it is
finally approved. I pointed out to him the numerous dangers which
could and probably would result from such a policy and he said
that the scheme has not yet been approved, although Marshall [3]
and Arnold [4] are in favour of it and it is now being argued in
Britain. If the British put up a case which would seem to indicate
lesser number of aircraft in the war theatres generally, then the
scheme will not be approved by the President.

Hopkins said that a similar policy was also being considered in
relation to army ground equipment. With the large army America is
raising, this would also mean that, as the personnel is drafted,
larger quantities of material would be retained in this country
and there would be less for the other countries including
Australia. This also is admitted, but Hopkins said it would not
occur in the case of Australia. I have just spoken to him again
and he assures, in general terms, that the Australian requirements
will be looked after. I feel that possibly the only hope of
clarifying matters would be for Churchill and the President to
make some special arrangement regarding Australia from both United
States and United Kingdom and such would have to be in specific
terms, both in regard to quantities and times of supply. In the
meantime, however, I am informed that regular supplies of aircraft
are going to the United States forces in Australia, whilst the
last ship that sailed from here carried a first-class collection
of munitions and they were in considerable quantities, especially
in the items which were really important. A Staff Officer from
Brett [5] also arrived here during the last two or three days and
I understand he is making special representations for additional
aircraft for Australia. Sir Charles Burnett [6] is here and will
be proceeding to England shortly. If he arrives before your
departure, I strongly urge that you have a discussion with him.

From what I hear he has made very good points in Australia's
favour in the right quarters here. Please do not use this
information. I propose to endeavour to see Stimson [7] tomorrow to
put our point of view to him as this might be helpful.

Your paragraph 3 -neither Smart [8] nor Henry [9] have had any
discussions with Marshall regarding the allocation of aircraft and
neither has joined in nor agreed with the present allocation.

Your paragraph 4-from my previous conversation with King [10], I
am certain that he is particularly anxious to see many more
aircraft in the Pacific area and I think that Admiral Towers, who
is his representative in London, will make a strong point of this.

I will, however, see King tomorrow if possible. [11] I had given
him your previous message.

Your paragraphs 5, 6 and 7-I discussed these matters with Hopkins,
who said that they had a full appreciation of the position and
were doing their best. He developed the discussion on the lines of
previous ones that they had a large number of men in Australia and
realised the responsibilities which they accepted and which they
were determined to carry out. I re-stated all the facts and the
dangers of not taking positive action and forwarding further
munitions, particularly aircraft, and he said that from their own
sources and from the previous advices from Mr Curtin [12] and
yourself, they were fully aware of the position. Nothing more
definite was forthcoming, although I had nearly two hours with
him.

Your paragraphs 8 and 9-I have sent you a separate message
regarding this matter. [13]

Your paragraph 10-this telegram [14] not yet received but in view
of urgency of foregoing matters have passed them to you without
waiting to see your report.

All very well. Best wishes.