1. The broad conclusion to which I have come after conferring with
the Prime Minister [2] and attending meetings of the War Cabinet
on Monday night and of the Pacific War Council last night is that
Australia has had very little if any share in the formulation and
direction of the general policy of the war. It seems to me that
policy in relation to the war has been determined outside the War
Cabinet by the Prime Minister and his Service advisers and that
Page [3] has had no share in the shaping of it. What takes place
at War Cabinet is for the most part a narrative of action to which
the Government is irrevocably committed or which has actually
taken place. Madagascar provides the latest example. [4]

2. In relation to Australia, the division of operational
responsibility as between Great Britain and the United States
seems to have led to a tendency to regard matters in the south
west Pacific as being of little concern to the United Kingdom
Government but of concern mainly to the United States Government.

The result is that there was no report even in relation to the
threatened Japanese attack or invasion of Australia, which one
would naturally assume would occupy a prominent part in the
proceedings. Further the Government's primary interest has been
with the defence of India and there is reason to believe that one
of the objectives of the concentration of aircraft carriers in the
Indian Ocean is to force the Japanese to operate on the Pacific
side of Singapore. That immediately adds to the danger to
Australia.

3. Nevertheless the Prime Minister has again promised me in the
presence of the Cabinet that if Australia is heavily invaded
(a) He will at once divert at least two divisions including an
armoured division as they pass round the Cape.

(b) He will throw everything possible into the defence of
Australia preferring it to the defence of India.

4. In reply to promises in 3, I stated that the problem was to
take such action now as this might discourage or prevent a
Japanese attempt to invade and not to await the disaster of actual
invasion.

(a) Provision of additional aircraft over and above what would be
obtained as a result of General MacArthur's [5] recommendations
under his directive.

(b) Undertaking to give greater support at Washington to General
MacArthur's recommendations for the south west Pacific.

(c) A munitions allocation system which will be more satisfactory
to Australia.

(d) A greater share by Australia's representative in the
formulation of war policy and strategy.

6. Regarding aircraft in 5(a) some positive suggestions from Air
Department would help me, providing they are sent by Monday
morning. [6] As the aircraft would be additional to ordinary
allocations the suggestions will probably be better received if
they are not capable of being regarded as excessive.

EVATT