1. I saw Roosevelt, Hopkins [1], Frankfurter [2], Sumner Welles
[3] today, and emphasized our needs in the strongest possible way.

The President is still very conscious of demands of other
theatres, but is intensely interested and sympathetic with
Australia, and I am very hopeful of immediate practical results.

2. They are all most anxious to avoid further public argument with
Churchill over Casey's appointment. [4] Especially, they say, they
are disturbed at local political embarrassment caused by
disclosure of the fact that Casey privately consulted American
leaders.

3. It might be better to say nothing more as to Casey's
appointment, except to make clear that in view of his excellent
services here, no possible objection on personal grounds could, or
would, be raised by you or me.

4. I have suggested strongly that Churchill's method of dealing
with Australia sometimes indicates party political bias and that
what is most essential is a broad settlement by which United
Kingdom as well as United States would give immediate positive
proof of their desire to assist Australia. Hopkins stressed the
need of starting from scratch again with Churchill in order to re-
establish friendliest feelings, and he will advise the President
to approach Churchill on the same lines.

5. Tomorrow we have a series of conferences with Marshall [5],
Arnold [6], King [7], and I am lunching with Marshall. All day
Sunday Smith [8], Robinson [9] and I are conferring with Hopkins
with a view to meeting Australia's requirements to the fullest
possible extent. Hopkins may hold the key to the position. He
realises the time factor is crucial.

6. Marshall's attitude towards yourself was more than friendly-it
was affectionate.

7. Will report further on Monday.