392 Mr R. G. Casey, Minister to the United States, to Department of External Affairs
Cablegram 404 WASHINGTON, 6 March 1942, 12.41 a.m.
MOST SECRET IMMEDIATE
New Zealand Minister here  has told me his views regarding the
control of the A.N.Z.A.C. area including the mainlands of
Australia and New Zealand and how he thinks the mind of his
Government will work.
I think you should know how the personality of Admiral King 
may well react at that proposal. He tends to be very interested
and conscientious regarding areas for which he is definitely
responsible, and much less interested in areas for which he is not
personally responsible. For instance, he makes little or no
distinction in his mind between his responsibility for the Pacific
area as a whole (exercised through his subordinate commanders at
Honolulu) and his responsibility for A.N.Z.A.C. area (through
Leary ). Under present conditions northern and eastern
boundaries of the A.N.Z.A.C. area mean very little to him, and if
A.N.Z.A.C. area command remains as it is he is likely to operate
considerable United States naval forces (drawn from Honolulu) in
or close to A.N.Z.A.C. area (as he has done lately) in addition to
forces officially designated to A.N.Z.A.C. area.
On the other hand, he had little or no direct responsibility for
A.B.D.A. area and as a result he took very little interest in it
by way of naval reinforcements, much as he was pressed to do so.
I reflected these views (which I still have excellent authority
for believing to be true) in my telegrams 245 and 383. 
Additionally if any supreme commander (even an American) of
Australia and New Zealand and A.N.Z.A.C. area were to be
interposed between King and Leary (in respect of A.N.Z.A.C. sea
area) his interest and sense of direct responsibility for naval
control of A.N.Z.A.C. sea area may diminish. If supreme commander
were to be an American General (and strangely enough particularly
if it were MacArthur ) I believe King's interest in A.N.Z.A.C.
area would be reduced. I realize that this may sound
incomprehensible in existing circumstances but I believe it to be
In other words by the re-establishment of the united command in
A.N.Z.A.C. area, unity of naval command in Pacific area as a whole
may be jeopardized.
[AA:A981, WAR 56A]