1. At the Pacific War Council to-night the following
recommendations were made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at
Washington as principles to guide Wavell [2] in answer to his
cabled request for instructions. This request has been repeated to
you. [3]

(1) Strenuous resistance should be maintained in Java by forces
already available there in order to gain as much time as possible
and delay further the Japanese offensive.

(2) Non-Dutch troops already in Java should continue fighting
alongside the Dutch.

(3) General Wavell should use his discretion in bringing in the
prospective naval and air forces envisaged in the terms of
paragraph 8 of his cable.

(4) America should be asked for additional naval and air support
for this area.

(5) There should be no attempt to land the Australian Corps in the
N.E.I.

(6) Australia should be told that the Australian Government's
policy of taking the whole of their forces back into the Pacific
area and to Australia would be accepted.

(7) The Australian Government should be asked to agree that the
Seventh Australian Division already on water should go to the most
urgent spot at the moment, which is Burma. This would be done in
conformity with the concluding sentence of paragraph 2 of your
telegram 127 [4] 'until other troops are available from
elsewhere'. These are the only troops that can reach Rangoon in
time to make certain that the Burma Road will be kept open and
thereby China kept in the fight. The position of this Convoy makes
it imperative that permission should be given to this course
within 24 hours.

(8) The next Division that will be shifted from the Middle East
will be the 70th British Division which, less one Brigade, will be
shipped to Bombay, railed through India and thence by ship to
Rangoon. The remaining Brigade will be used to garrison Ceylon.

(9) The remaining Australian Divisions should go as fast as
possible back into the Australian area. The leading elements of
the 6th Australian Division already embarking and will go straight
through to Australia. 2. It was also recommended strongly that the
United States should give the maximum help in all form[s] of
equipment and personnel and that more American submarines should
be sent for offensive duties into the ABDA area.

3. The telegram from New Zealand in regard to strengthening of New
Zealand and Fiji as bases [5] should be taken into consideration
immediately by the British Chiefs of Staff and also by the joint
Staff Committee in Washington.

PAGE