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234 Lord Cranborne, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister

Cablegram 915 LONDON, 28 December 1941, [1.45 a.m.] [1]


My telegram 913 of 27th December. [2]

1. We feel that the misunderstandings to which we refer are mainly
due to the rapidity with which developments have occurred and, to
the impossibility of communicating to you in full correspondence
with His Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon [3], discussions with the
Netherlands Government and Portuguese Ambassador here [4] and
information from other sources.

2. Discussions with Portugal for the defence of Portuguese Timor
with their concurrence arose out of the suggestion made in
Commonwealth telegram 588. [5] These discussions led to agreement
by the Portuguese Government to send an officer to Singapore to
prepare plans. This procedure was interrupted by the outbreak of
war with Japan, which made it urgently necessary to consider some
more rapid arrangement. We had also heard from Mr. Duff Cooper [6]
that the Dutch had already prepared plans to move into Portuguese

3. It was in these circumstances that we asked the Portuguese
Government to agree to instruct their Governor in Timor [7] to
invite assistance of Australian and Netherlands forces in Dutch
Timor in the event of a Japanese attack or to acquiesce in its
being furnished if there were no time for an invitation. To this
the Portuguese agreed (my telegram 829 of 13th December [8]). We
had contemplated that circumstances would admit of Australian and
Netherlands commanders [9] going to Dilli and consulting the
Governor before any troops were moved. Their troops were moved
before any understanding with the Governor had been sought since
in view of the presence of Japanese submarines in the
neighbourhood of Timor the Governor-General of the Netherlands
East Indies [10] felt that immediate action was necessary. We had
hoped that taking a realistic view of latest developments in the
war in the Far East the Portuguese Government would regard the
imminent threat of an attack as tantamount to an actual attack. As
it turned out the Portuguese Government interpreted the agreement
with us in its strictest literal sense, i.e. as applying not in
the event of a threat of an attack but only after an actual attack
had taken place. It is clear that in the first instance this did
not represent a change of attitude on their part and that our
first impression as conveyed to you in my telegram 839 of 17th
December [11] was wrong.

4. Our first intimation of the move that was actually made was
contained in your telegram 798 [12] (which was received here on
the afternoon of 15th December) from which we noted that only two
hours were to be allowed for consultation. This placed us in a
dilemma. On the one hand while we hoped that the Governor of
Portuguese Timor might interpret his instructions as warranting
acquiescence even before an actual attack developed, we were
apprehensive of the effect on our very important and most secret
Atlantic discussions with Portugal if he did not. On the other
hand we realised the vital strategic importance of Timor and could
not judge from here the imminence of the emergency. We did not
feel therefore that we could recommend recall of the expedition
which had probably already started (it was then 16th December
local time) and, given the presence of submarines, realized that
it might well be dangerous for its arrival at Dilli to be delayed.

In the circumstances we felt that the only course was to accept
the situation but to try if possible to get a longer period for
consultation before the landing was effected if this were
practicable. Hence our telegram 833. [13]

5. As regards the statement outlined in that telegram, we
telegraphed on 16th December to Lisbon a text in which we hoped to
obtain the concurrence of the Portuguese Government. We then heard
that the Portuguese attitude to the action taken was violently
unfavourable and we were faced with a major crisis in our
relations with Portugal. His Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon stated
that the only chance of retaining any vestige of Portuguese
confidence in us was to present the matter in such a way as to
enable the Portuguese Government to plead force majeure. He
accordingly advised a different form of statement omitting any
reference to the alliance, and emanating from the Netherlands and
Commonwealth Governments only, preferably the former alone (see my
telegram 839). It had become urgently necessary that some
statement should be made and eventually the Dutch agreed to issue
theirs alone.

6. You will realise that it had become essential in order to
prevent irreparable damage to the alliance and to the recent most
secret strategic arrangements (see my telegram under reference
paragraph 1) to make it clear to the Portuguese Government that
the decision was not part of a prearranged plan but was dictated
by reasons which the local authorities had for believing that an
attack was imminent. In our expression of regret to the Portuguese
Government we deplored the military exigency which obliged the
allied military authorities to take the action which had proved
unwelcome to the Portuguese Government. We have not at any time
suggested that any blame attached to those authorities for this.

On the contrary our public statement emphasized the positive
necessity for this action and this is the line which our
Ambassador has repeatedly and most frankly taken with the
Portuguese Government.

7. All of Sir R. Campbell's reports show that we are bound to take
into account the Portuguese, attitude (see my telegram 906 of 27th
December [14]). But on the essential point we have remained
absolutely firm, namely that our object is the safeguarding of
vital interests by the denial of Portuguese Timor to the enemy and
that pre-requisite of any solution must be the presence there of a
force sufficient to deal with sudden aggression (see my telegram
886 paragraph 3 [15]).

8. We hope that the foregoing will help to clear up some of the
points raised. We should greatly regret it if the Commonwealth
Government felt that there have been any avoidable causes for
misunderstanding between us and are sure that they will appreciate
that the whole question has been and continues to be one of great
difficulty and anxiety for us.

1 Inserted from the London copy on file AA:A2937, Timor-
Portuguese, defence operations,i.

2 Document 233
3 Sir Ronald H. Campbell.

4 Dr A. R. de S. Monteiro.

5 Document 62.

6 U.K. Minister of State for Far Eastern Affairs resident in

7 M. de A. Ferreira de Carvalho.

8 Document 191.

9 Lt Col W. W. Leggatt and Lt Col W. Detiger.

10 Jonkheer Dr A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.

11 Document 202.

12 Document 195.

13 Dispatched to December. On file AA: A981, Timor (Portuguese) 3,

14 On the file cited in note 13.

15 Dispatched 25 December. On the file cited in note 13.

[AA : A981, TIMOR (PORTUGUESE) 3, i]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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