I saw the Secretary of State [2] this evening and showed him a
copy of my telegram No. 1055 [3] and informed him of the
conversation in detail. I had seen the British Ambassador [4]
beforehand and so was able to say to the Secretary of State that
the British Ambassador's view and my own was that our respective
governments had complete trust in his handling of the situation
and that if he was able to revive the conversations directed
towards a temporary agreement with Japan on any terms that he
believed reasonable our governments would back him. Even at this
late hour our governments had keen anxi[ety] and desire that the
conversations may be salvaged.

The Secretary of State is to see Kurusu [5] and the Japanese
Ambassador [6] at 10 a.m. to-morrow December 1st at their request.

The Secretary of State clearly has no real hope that the situation
can be saved. He believes that the Japanese are even now,
practically speaking, on the march.

The Secretary of State was still very bitter against the Chinese.

It appears that, in addition to the President [7] having been very
impressed with the representations of the Chinese, the Secretary
of Wars and others used their influence in Cabinet here on the
side of the Chinese. This finally sealed the fate of the Secretary
of State's modus vivendi.

The Secretary of State cannot see any advantage in the British
Ambassador seeing Kurusu. The British Ambassador tends to agree
with this. It is unlikely that Kurusu would have any viewpoint to
put forward that he did not put to me and if by a bad chance such
a meeting became known publicly, much damage might be done.

I ended by saying to the Secretary of State that the major policy
decision that the United States Government would take to-morrow
was one that would influence the history of the world.