Cablegram 25 [1] CANBERRA, 29 November 1941
MOST SECRET
I have just been speaking to Casey [2] direct telephone. From this
and other advices it is clear that Washington talks will almost
certainly break down as a direct result of Chinese intervention
apparently designed for the very purpose of preventing any
agreement. If this becomes general impression it is obvious that
the reaction may be unfavourable to China herself It has always
been aim of this country that China should be safeguarded in any
agreement at least against accentuation of Japanese armed attacks.
In negotiations for temporary modus vivendi that has been made
reasonably clear. Of course we understand that Chinese objective
may be to precipitate general Pacific war in hope that Japanese
pressure will be diverted elsewhere. But it is possible that the
only result of her present intervention in preventing agreement
may be that she will have to face accentuated Japanese attack
without being assured of armed support of United States. Further,
in absence of that support it may be physically impossible for
other countries to give her assistance she deserves. Of course if
United States were to become engaged in armed resistance to
aggression position might be transformed.
In these circumstances suggest you point out Chinese authorities
(1) possible danger to China herself from her very strong
intervention, (2) desirability of her obtaining from United States
some assurance of armed support in event accentuation Japanese
attacks. Intervention for the latter purpose would be far more
valuable than her intervention for the purpose of terminating
preliminary conversations at a period when it is essential that we
should gain further time.
I would sum up our position in words of Prime Minister [3] to me
this morning: 'China does not want to be treated as a pawn in this
game. But neither does Australia'.
I am sending last two cables of Casey. [4] Also simultaneous wires
from here to Bruce and Casey. [5]
EVATT
[AA : A981, JAPAN 178]