132 Advisory War Council Minute 573
Extract CANBERRA, 28 November 1941
AGENDUM No. 140/1941 -CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN U.S.A. AND JAPAN 
POSITION OF CHINA
3. The importance of safeguarding the interests of China was
discussed and the representations of Chiang Kai-shek  referred
to in Mr. Casey's cablegram 1037  were noted.
4. Mr. Menzies  suggested that a cablegram be sent to the
Australian Minister at Chungking  requesting him, in
collaboration with the British Ambassador , to put to Chiang
Kai-shek the following points:-
(a) Our settled policy is to do nothing to prejudice the interests
(b) The present negotiations with Japan are of great value, and
they should continue, in view of the importance of gaining time;
(c) It may appear from the course of the negotiations that Chinese
interests are not being safeguarded;
(d) This, however, is not so, as the greatest possible advantages
accrue to China by reason of the fact that the United States are
firmly in the middle of the negotiations and they are becoming
more and more involved. In the long run, this is the best thing
that could happen to protect the interests of China.
This was endorsed by the Council. The Minister for External
Affairs  stated that he would arrange for a cablegram to be
sent to the Australian Minister at Chungking on these lines. 
5. The position was summarised by the Prime Minister  as
Objectives of Policy
The following is a summary of objectives of Policy:-
(i) To endeavour to gain time to strengthen the defences of the
A.B.C.D. Powers  in the Pacific and the completion of joint
plans of operation.
(ii) To deter Japan from further aggressive action, the initiative
in this respect resting mainly with the U.S.A.
(iii) To explore the possibilities of a general Pacific settlement
with Japan, the initiative again resting mainly with the U.S.A.,
in view of the necessity of ensuring a common front with her.
(iv) To keep Japan out of the war.
(v) If we are unsuccessful in doing that, to ensure that we will
have the co-operation of America.
Main Initiative with U.S.A.
As we do not wish to become involved in war with Japan without
U.S.A. co-operation, there is no choice but to leave the main
initiative to U.S.A., whilst at the same time maintaining contact
as to what is happening and expressing opinions where asked for or
where it is deemed prudent to suggest a word of advice.
The advantages of this course of action outweigh greatly the
possibility of finding ourselves in the position that we have to
go to war with Japan without American help, because of some sudden
reversal of policy on the part of the latter, or of some lead by
us which American opinion might not support.
The Commonwealth Government has insisted that the door should not
be closed to an understanding with Japan while the possibility
exists, so long as we do not sacrifice any vital interests during
the course of any discussions.
It is important to note, however, that the door can be kept open
only so long as the Japanese are prepared to negotiate and the
point is not reached at which the U.S.A. and the British Empire
are called upon to sacrifice the vital principles for which they
stand. However, if Japan thinks that time is on her side and she
is awaiting the outcome of the German-Russian conflict or other
decisive military action, it is all to the good. We are each
backing our own opinions, and if we are right, Japan will have
more time to think before acting rashly.
The above views were noted and endorsed by the Advisory War
[AA : A2680, 140/1941]