I acknowledge with thanks your cablegrams P.2 to P.6 inclusive and
have studied with interest the statement made by you to United
Kingdom War Cabinet and the summary of the discussion. [1]

Your cablegrams are being submitted for early consideration by War
Cabinet [2] and in the meantime the following observations are
furnished:-

(i) Representations for increase in air strength in Far East. The
reasons of the Air Ministry outlined in your P.5 as to why in
their opinion immediate action to strengthen air forces in Malaya
is not practicable at present are noted, together with the promise
to review the position if the Middle East operations are
unsuccessful or in the event of the intensification of the
Japanese threat. It is observed that you are continuing to press
the urgency of immediate reinforcement. This attitude meets with
our full support.

In regards to expediting Beaufort production, War Cabinet has been
giving urgent consideration to expediting the programme. [3] Any
assistance you can render in regard to the delivery of machine
tools as requested in my cablegram of 18th November [4] will be of
the greatest importance in accelerating the programme.

(ii) Possibilities of Japanese attack on neighbouring nations. In
regard to the four possibilities referred to by you [5] :-

(a) Japanese attack on Russia;

(b) Japanese attack on Kunming and the Burma Road;

(c) Japanese attack on Netherlands East Indies;

(d) Japanese invasion of Thailand;

our views on (a) and (b) were contained in cablegrams Nos. 714 and
722. [6]

In regard to (c) it is noted that you have had discussions with
the Foreign Office on the question of an undertaking with the
Dutch. Our most recent advice on this subject is Dominions Office
cablegram No. M.295. [7]

The main factor on (d) appears to be the President's statement to
the Prime Minister at the Atlantic Conference. [8]

(iii) General Policy in the Pacific. The objectives as stated by
you are:-

(a) To keep Japan out of the war;

(b) If we are unsuccessful in doing this we must ensure that we
will have the co-operation of America.

The viewpoint which you put forward towards the end of your P.3
does not appear to have been very comprehensively dealt with by
the Prime Minister, according to the third paragraph of Part 2
ofyour P.4, though the constitutional difficulties of the
President are of course fully understood.

This subject is being further examined for consideration by War
Cabinet, and you will be advised as soon as possible.

(iv) Naval Defence. We have agreed to the four Australian
destroyers joining the Far Eastern Fleet after refitting, subject
to their return to the Australia Station when other destroyers
become available.

The Australian Chief of the Naval Staff is proceeding to Singapore
for the Naval Staff Conversations in December, and War Cabinet has
had a discussion with him regarding the United States Naval Staff
contention that it is unnecessary to maintain so many Australian
and New Zealand cruisers in Australian and New Zealand waters. [9]
This matter is being further examined before Admiral Royle's
departure.

CURTIN