Please advise United Kingdom Authorities that we considered
measures contemplated in M. 44 [1] and proposed to advise that in
our opinion further consideration would be desirable before
action.

In this we were influenced by the belief that delay of a few days
would enable consultation with United States which we regarded as
of greatest importance.

It also appeared to us that the Japanese declaration of policy on
August 2nd [2] and the reported release of certain of the arrested
persons might be matters affecting United Kingdom Government's
attitude.

We noted that Matsuoka [3] made no specific reference to closer
ties with Axis powers. Our impression was that the arrests were
the result of pressure by militants and that Moderates might yet
regain sufficient influence to hold the position.

We wish you to make it clear that we are completely hostile to a
policy of mere appeasement of Japan. On the other hand Empire
naturally does not want to get into war with Japan. We have enough
to handle in Germany and Italy. If it appears that Japan is bent
upon pursuing provocative acts our policy in reply should be firm
but such as will if possible avoid war and if that appears out of
our control secure for us the maximum time.

How such a policy would be implemented must no doubt be decided on
the occasion and issue of the moment. We would respect the
judgment of the United Kingdom Government on this point, but we
feel strongly that where the ultimate issue is a war in which we
cannot afford to become involved tactics of bluff should not be
used.

To us it appears that counter arrest and irritant tactics will not
serve to restrain the present Japanese administration but on the
contrary would prove an aid to those elements who see the present
as the moment to exploit British European preoccupation.

Before we could express these views we received M. 45 [4]
informing us of action taken and we now note that it proved
impossible to prevent these steps from being published and
becoming a public issue. The very adequate explanation given on
enquiry by the Japanese Ambassador [5] Will nevertheless not serve
to explain tactics of delay and irritation set out in sub-
paragraphs B and C of paragraph 2 of M. 44.

We understand the United Kingdom Government's intention to be to
minimise the consequence of the incidents and avoid provoking
further acts by Japanese military extremists.

We will no doubt be fully and promptly consulted before further
steps are taken. [6]

MENZIES