Repeated to Tokyo No. 22.

My telegram No. 373. [1]

Information contained in my telegram No. 378 [2] was conveyed to
the Secretary of State [3] in a form that irritated him
considerably and caused him to tell the British Ambassador [4]
quite abruptly that he did not appreciate being lectured by the
British Government on how to conduct himself. The incident will
take at least a few days to blow over.

(2) The British Ambassador meanwhile has received instructions
from London to the effect that, following on the speech of the
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs [5] on May 5th and
subject to the concurrence of the Dominion Governments concerned
he should inform the United States Government confidentially that
the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [6] proposed to
make a public statement closely corresponding to that of the
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs and saying, in effect,
that we will join with the Dutch in defending the line from Malaya
through the Netherlands East Indies to New Zealand.

I have discussed the above proposal with the British Ambassador
and I agreed with him that in view of the first paragraph above it
would be inexpedient to say this to the Secretary of State at this
moment as it would be likely to be interpreted as arising out of
the above incident and to indicate the decision to go our own way
in the Pacific independent of the United States which might have
unfortunate results.

The British Ambassador has telegraphed the British Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs suggesting that he (Halifax) should call
the Secretary of State's attention to the speech of the
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the fact that the
Dutch have been pressing His Majesty's Government for a statement
of the intention to defend the Netherlands East Indies and that
the British Government believe that they must in the near future
give the Dutch assurances they seek. Halifax suggests then asking
for the views of the United States Government as to whether such
assurances should be public or confidential.

There is also this point. It is well known to Japanese that United
States, Dutch and ourselves have been in active discussion on the
Far East problems. If we now announced defensive agreement with
Dutch, Japan may well make capital out of non-participation of
strongest party.

I believe, therefore, that a confidential undertaking with the
Dutch is preferable at the present stage to a public statement.

Approach suggested in your telegram No. 47 from the Acting Prime
Minister [7] has been delayed for the reason given in the last
sentence, Para (8) my telegram No. 373. [8] I believe that the
State Department may be ready to talk by June 2nd. I will, of
course, co-ordinate the views with British Embassy and make joint
approach with them.

CASEY