Cablegram 340 WASHINGTON, 8 May 1941, 7.09 p.m.
MOST SECRET
FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF [1] FROM NAVAL ATTACHE [2] TROPIC No. 10.
United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have informed United States
authorities that they are in provisional agreement with the report
of the recent Staff Conversations in Washington and that they are
submitting the report to His Majesty's Government for approval.
(2) At the risk of duplication I feel obliged to inform you with
reference to my Tropic No. 6 [3] and Mr. Casey's telegram No. 328
[4] that the decision of the British Government has now been
received.
(3) It adheres closely to the views expressed in Mr. Fadden's
telegram No. 40 [5] and states:
(a) Our opinion which is concurred [with] in general by both
Australia and New Zealand is that any marked advance by the United
States Navy in or into the Atlantic would be on the whole more
likely to deter Japan from going to war than the maintenance of
the present very large United States fleet at Hawaii, and further
that it might exercise a profound influence on the present
critical situation in Spain, Turkey and Vichy France.
(b) Problem for the United States authorities is to so judge the
degree of transfer that while still retaining the deterrent effect
of a strong United States fleet in the Pacific there will also be
the deterrent effect of an increased United States fleet in the
Atlantic.
(c) It is not only strength but also the composition of the fleet
in the Pacific which will act as a deterrent: in our view the
necessary effect will not remain unless the fleet is in the
Pacific consisting of not less than 6 capital ships and 2 aircraft
carriers. The inclusion of the latter is considered of the
greatest importance.
CASEY
[AA: A981, FAR EAST 25B, i]