Reference my immediately preceding telegram, paragraph 4 [1]: The
following are the tentative views of our military advisers:

References are to paragraphs in the telegraphic report of the
Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference -
(1) Paragraphs 2 and 5: Influence of the United States in
restricting freedom to move southwards.

Admittedly this is a matter of opinion. Some Japanese capital
ships would certainly be available for the Malaya area but
advisers doubt whether cruisers would be available in large
numbers for attacking trade. They agree with the views expressed
in paragraph 2 of the Report of the Conference.

(2) Paragraph 10(b): The scale of the attack on South Pacific
Trade Routes:

The view expressed by the Conference appears to be a fair
description of the likely scale of attack.

(3) Paragraph 10(c): Establishment of bases by Japan in New Guinea
and Fiji area:

Advisers agree with the view expressed by the Conference, and note
with satisfaction that a good deal has already been done, and that
the matter is continuing to receive active consideration.

(4) Paragraph 10(d): A major attack on sea communications:

While not ruling out the possibility, advisers do not regard this
course of action likely. A world wide redistribution of forces
would be necessary in such an eventuality and it would, they
consider, be useless to attempt to draw up plans now on account of
the many variable factors which make it impracticable to forecast
the forces which might be available over and above those already
provided for. All that can be usefully done at present is to draw
up plans on the basis of the most probable situation with the
forces likely to be available.

(5) Paragraph 11 (a): Protection of troop convoys in the Indian
Ocean: Initially we shall have only one capital ship in the Indian
Ocean. To provide capital ship escort for convoys it will, at
first, be necessary to accept reduced frequency in sailings. As
regards further reinforcements, see the preceding paragraph.

Although capital ship escort appears desirable, it may be found
possible, depending on actual course of events, to accept a lower
scale of escort, e.g. two large cruisers.

(6) Paragraphs 23-25: Definition of act of war by Japan: Views of
our military advisers have already been stated in paragraph 2(B)
of my telegram of 21st March, Commonwealth of Australia 180, New
Zealand 98. [2] They agree with the great importance attached to
avoiding delay in reaching decision but the matter cannot be
decided on military grounds alone and further study is being given
to the problem in its political aspects. The advisers consider
that advance notification to the Japanese Government of the
interpretation we should place on certain actions by them is open
to the objection that it will amount to pre-judging what would
constitute an act of war by Japan. On military grounds they regard
this as dangerous except in collaboration with the United States.

They agree with the Commonwealth Government's views as regards the
Philippines.

(7) Paragraph 7: Australian Forces for Koepang and Ambon. The
advisers agree that on military grounds it is desirable that these
moves should be completed prior to the outbreak of hostilities but
consider that such moves would provoke Japan to take counter
measures. This again introduces political considerations which are
being further studied. Advisers assume that control of troops at
Ambon will be cleared up at the forthcoming conference.

(8) Progress of naval reinforcement east of Suez in the event of
serious threat to Australia (question raised in Commonwealth of
Australia telegram 187, paragraph 5). Our advisers' view is that
no useful purpose would be served by attempting to draw up plans
at Singapore for such an eventuality at this stage. To attempt to
forecast the forces which might be available is quite
impracticable and will therefore be misleading.