Reference your No. 202 [1], I appreciate and share your anxieties
though I hope that after reading this cable you may feel somewhat
reassured.

In regard to the earlier opinion that the Benghazi front could be
held, it is, of course, disappointing to experience this setback
as an important objective of the earlier offensive was not only
the destruction of Italian armies in Libya but also denial of the
use of aerodromes on the east side of the Gulf of Sirte.

Had we decided to press on to Tripoli it was realised that we
would encounter difficulties in establishing and maintaining lines
of communication across Sirte Desert. Particularly with the
approach of the hot season it remains to be seen how the enemy
fares.

The Intelligence Branch of the War Office inclines to the belief
from the manner of the use of German propaganda regarding the
strength of their forces in Tripoli that it is not as great as
they would like us to believe. War Office reports indicate one or
possibly two light armoured divisions. The Germans are considered
bound to have taken any risk of gravity involved in this operation
as a means of diverting strength from Lustre.

A later report from Wavell [2] is more reassuring and he has been
out to see the situation. A more positive statement on the
position must await his appreciation. For publicity purposes it is
well to recall his withdrawal tactics earlier in the campaign and
their ultimate success. You will observe in regard to the 7th
Division that he hopes to send it to Greece.

It is also important to remember that lines of communication of
the enemy from Italy and Sicily will be difficult to maintain for
a force of any great strength and the navy are redoubling their
efforts at interruption.

I shall advise you further on receipt of further information from
Wavell.

In regard to No. 197 [3] the following information received from
the Air Ministry regarding air strength.

(1) The present strength-eight squadrons plus three heavy bomber
squadrons operating from Greece as an advanced base.

(2) Two more Blenheims [? squadron] are due to go this month and
one fighter-squadron in Egypt is being re-equipped before transfer
this month. These make the initial strength 14.

(3) Two fighter-squadrons are being transferred from Sudan to
Egypt and events in Abyssinia may release more.

(4) Four more fighter squadrons are being formed in Egypt from
existing personnel.

(5) Plans are on foot for further reinforcements and every means
possible is being used to get more into Egypt. The fighter-
aircraft of those landed at West Africa, now en route or to be
shipped in April, are double the number at present in the Middle
East which is very substantial.

(6) There is also now the added advantage of Yugo-Slav strength
and resistance, which seemed unlikely when Lustre was first
decided upon, but which has undoubtedly been much influenced by
the presence of British troops in Greece.

Further advice will be forwarded regarding Blamey's reference to
the strength of the army that should be maintained in Greece. [4]
The disposition of forces referred to by Blamey in your cable 6th
April {5] is a matter which Wavell will, no doubt, cover in his
appreciation. I shall again stress the importance of adequate
number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and tanks but the
understanding is that this force takes the field adequately
equipped.

I can assure you that the matters which are troubling you are
constantly engaging my attention and discussions. Churchill is
fully aware of the problem and is most helpful; but I do not doubt
that whatever comes of it in the short run, this Greek campaign
represents a sound and unavoidable decision, which must have
valuable results in more than one country.