War Cabinet has given close consideration to your cable M.13 [1]
together with copy of telegrams which have been passing on the
question of aid to Greece. [2]

The grave risk which is involved in the adventure is fully
recognised.

The factors to be weighed are-
1. The effect of failure on our part to assist Greece on public
opinion in Turkey, Yugo-Slavia, Greece and America against
2. The effect of a disastrous defeat and evacuation, assuming the
latter proves possible, on opinion and action of Japan-in
particular of Japan-and of the same countries above-mentioned.

We assume that full consideration has been given to the extremely
hazardous nature of the operation in view of the disparity between
opposing forces both in number and training. We cannot help but
feel that the attitude of General Papagos [3] which at one stage
of discussions was described as unaccommodating and defeatist may
possibly reflect a substantial body of opinion in Greece and may
indicate a lowering of the morale of the Greek Forces. We are
informed by General Blamey, General Officer Commanding A.I.F.,
Middle East, that the British Forces immediately available consist
of the 6th Australian Division, the 7th Australian Division, New
Zealand Division, one armoured brigade and ancillary troops. The
7th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division have not been
trained as complete divisions and there are practically no other
troops in the Middle East not fully engaged. Copy of his cable was
directed by the Minister for the Army [4] to be sent to you
simultaneously with despatch to himself and we think it advisable
that you draw the attention of the United Kingdom Government and
its advisers to the observations made by him.

There can be no doubt that the landing of British troops in Greece
will result in every effort being made by Germany with large
available forces to inflict an overwhelming defeat particularly
upon the British Forces engaged. The aid which the Empire can give
is limited by the available troops in the Middle East and the flow
of reinforcements which is able to be maintained.

The difficulties with respect to maintenance of supplies,
munitions and equipment, are sufficiently obvious to you not to
require recapitulation in this cable. The mining of the Suez we
regard as most significant and as probably not unrelated to German
plans in the Balkans. The ability of Germany substantially to
impede the traffic via the Suez cannot we feel be over-estimated.

Notwithstanding these considerations War Cabinet is undivided in
its view that if the military advisers, having properly evaluated
the risks which must be run the large fully equipped and
numerically superior German Forces which can be directed to these
operations to the adequacy in numbers and equipment of the Greeks
to deal with the first eruption of the German Forces advise the
adventure that they should agree, in the high cause to which they
will be dedicated, to make the troops required available for this
adventure with the profound conviction that they will worthily
uphold the glorious traditions of the A.I.F. fighting side by side
with so gallant an ally. [5] The Australian Government steadfastly
stands beside the United Kingdom Government in this high
enterprise should it be now decided to embark upon the same.

The decision having once been taken we believe should be
implemented with the greatest despatch and we stress the
importance not only of pressing on the adventure with full forces
available and with the greatest of resolution but the wise and
full provision against the possibility of a forced evacuation.

We require however the assurance that the projected operations
have a reasonable chance of success and in view of the great
disparity of forces to which we have drawn attention and our
feeling that this is a desperate venture, desire that you should
inform yourself fully of the grounds upon which any such
evaluation of the chance is based and in turn acquaint us with the
same.

In view of the uncertain military bearing of General Papagos we
place the greatest importance upon General Wilson [6] being
available to assume command at the earliest possible moment.

Finally we strongly support your view with regard to the action of
the Secretary of State for F.A. [7] entering into an agreement
affecting Dominion troops without prior consultation. Whilst
appreciating the difficult circumstances in which he was placed we
feel nevertheless the repetition of such an action might well have
far reaching and unfortunate imperial repercussions.

FADDEN